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FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CRIMINAL
SENTENCING IN ILLINOIS: THE TIME
FOR CHANGE IS NOWt
DAVID

H.

NORRIS*

&

THOMAS PETERS**

INTRODUCTION

On December 28, 1977, Governor James Thompson signed into
law Public Act 80-1099 which transformed Illinois' criminal sentencing and corrections scheme from indeterminate to determinate
sentencing.1 With its mandatory terms of imprisonment, determinate sentences, abolition of parole and longer penitentiary
sentences, the determinate sentencing system, otherwise known as
Class X legislation, implemented a "tough on crime" mandate. The
law has now been in effect for sixteen years, causing a substantial
and ever increasing burden on Illinois' fiscal resources. 2 The heaviest burden of determinate sentencing has been the dramatic explo-

sion in Illinois' prison population and its accompanying financial
and social costs.

In 1989, Illinois had the fastest growing prison population in
the nation.3 Now, Illinois prisons confine over 32,000 adults. 4 This
t This is the second of two articles concerning some of the major forces
affecting Illinois' prison overcrowding problem. This article addresses fiscal
responsibility and criminal sentencing. The first article addressed inmate
release decisions and policy.
* B.A., Indiana University, 1981; J.D., The John Marshall Law School,
cum laude, 1992.
** B.S., MacMurray College, 1970; J.D., The John Marshall Law School,
1975.
1. Marvin E. Aspen, New Class X Sentencing Law: An Analysis, 66 ILL.
B.J. 344, 347 (1978).
2. See generally James R. Thompson, Illinois' Response to the Problem of
Prison Overcrowding, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 203 (discussing the problems of increased prison overcrowding on budgets and law enforcement).
3. ILLINOIS DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, TRANSITION PAPER 1 (1990) (stating
that in fiscal year 1989, "Illinois' prison population grew by 20.9%") [hereinafter
TRANSITION PAPER].
4. Rick Pearson, State Prisons are Approaching Their Capacity
Lawmakers Warned, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26, 1993, § 2, at 2. The Illinois Department of Corrections ("I.D.O.C.") Director, Howard Peters, III, told the General
Assembly that the adult prison population totaled 32,038 as of Feb. 25, 1993. Id.
See also ILLINOIS COMPTROLLER'S OFFICE, STATE OF ILL., COMPTROLLER'S
MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT 27 (Oct./Nov. 1992) [hereinafter COMPTROLLER'S
MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT]; BUREAU OF JUST., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BULL. 2
(1990); Dan Culloton, Prison Chief Says State Must Revamp Sentencing, CHI.
TRIB., May 16, 1991, § 2, at 2.
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figure is three times the number of inmates present in Illinois prisons in 1977, when the legislature enacted determinate sentencing.
Although Illinois has the most ambitious prison building program
in the country its facilities still house 11,000 inmates over their
rated capacity.5 This situation has worsened to such a degree that
the Illinois Department of Corrections ("I.D.O.C.") recently concluded that "Illinois cannot build its way out of the ...prison over'6
crowding [problem]."
Crime cannot be eliminated. The question is one of efficient
use of scarce resources. Punishment can take many forms: fines,
probation, imprisonment or electronic monitoring. Which punishment is appropriate and to what extent it should be imposed are
often difficult questions to answer. But whatever the answer, there
are costs imposed on society as well as on the accused. The legislature must pay more attention to the cost consequences of Illinois'
sentencing policies.
For more than a decade, the mandate has been to incarcerate
an ever increasing number of convicted persons. This "tough on
crime" approach, although politically popular, has continued to
take a bigger bite out of Illinois' finite fiscal resources at the expense of other important social needs. In fiscal 1992, the I.D.O.C.
was the fifth largest spender of money from the General Revenue
Fund. It is easy to say "throw them all in jail" but, at some point,
the bills must be paid. The issue then changes to whether we are
willing to sacrifice monies for education, road construction, economic development and other State needs in the name of shortterm political goals.
This article examines Illinois' sentencing system, asks a few
relevant questions and proposes some potential solutions. With particular emphasis on penitentiary sentences, this article begins with
a brief description of the types of criminal sentences. It then continues to trace the history of Illinois' cyclical criminal sentencing
policy. This section notes the somewhat inconsistent legislative use
of penological theories in the State's transformation from an inde5. See Pearson, supra note 4, at 2 (I.D.O.C. Director stating that 32,038
adult inmates currently reside in adult correctional facilities which have a rated
capacity of 20,877); see also COMPTROLLER'S MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT, supra
note 4, at 27 (stating that Illinois has built 14 new prisons since 1975).
6. COMPTROLLER'S MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 27; see ILLINOIS DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF ILL., STATISTICAL PRESENTATION 1991 i

(Apr. 1992) [hereinafter STATISTICAL PRESENTATION 1991]. See also Don Hayner, Are Jails the Answer?, CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, at 1. I.D.O.C. Director
Howard A. Peters, III, discusses his views on Illinois' prison population
problems); Harold Henderson, Another Mess Big Jim Left Behind, THE
READER, June 21, 1991, § 1, at 52 (I.D.O.C. Director Howard A. Peters, III says
that the state cannot build its way out of the prison overcrowding problem; stating further that the cost would be $1.4 billion to build the new prisons and $442
million to operate).
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terminate to determinate sentencing system. Part IV examines the
penological theories which underlie most sentencing systems: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation, and applies
them to analyze the current Illinois sentencing model. Next, Part
V chronicles the recent explosion in Illinois' inmate population and
the corresponding prison overcrowding problem, attributing the explosion to the implementation of determinate and mandatory
prison sentences. This Part also examines the cost of incarceration
and contrasts incarceration with more cost efficient alternatives.
Finally, Part VI proposes some minimal statutory changes which
would, if implemented, save Illinois hundreds of millions of dollars
and diminish Illinois' prison overcrowding problem.
Any prison overcrowding equation is a product of two major
variables. 7 The first article of this series8 dealt with the "back end"
variable, releases, and offered a modest proposal to assist the Department of Corrections in coping with the immediate, or emergency problem of prison crowding. This article addresses the "front
end" variable, admissions, and proposes a solution which hopefully,
will alleviate the protracted prison overcrowding problem. The authors then return to the "back end" variable to cite additional ways
by which the State could reduce the prison population and save millions of dollars in the process. In conclusion, the article examines
the interaction of these two proposals, their political ramifications
and the accompanying fiscal savings.
I.

INDETERMINATE, DETERMINATE AND MANDATORY SENTENCES

Illinois has employed determinate, indeterminate and
mandatory sentencing throughout most of its history.9 In order to
understand Illinois' present determinate sentencing scheme, it is
helpful to define these terms.
Indeterminate sentences are terms of imprisonment expressed
in a range of years, for example, 10 to 20 years. 10 The sentencing
judge sets the minimum and maximum terms of incarceration. The
corrections authorities, usually the parole board, then release the
inmate once he has been "rehabilitated" or upon the completion of
7. Another important variable is, of course, prison capacity. Moreover, the
rated capacity for a particular institution is often an ever changing number due,
in part, to political concerns. See generally Jeff Bleich, The Politics of Prison
Crowding, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1125 (1989).
8. Thomas Peters & David H. Norris, ReconsideringParole Release Decisions in fIlinois: Facts Myths and the Need for Policy Changes, 24 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 815 (1991).
9. See infra notes 10-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of Illinois' sentencing system; see generally Aspen, supra note 1, at 344-45.
10. See Peters & Norris, supra note 8, at 819.
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his maximum term.'1 Indeterminate sentencing is based on the
theory that a prisoner need only be incarcerated until he is rehabilitated. 12 As the sentencing judge is not in a position to calculate
rehabilitation at sentencing, the parole board, now called the Prisoner Review Board, makes this determination after the prisoner
has served a portion of his indeterminate sentence.' 3
Determinate sentences, on the other hand, are terms of imprisonment expressed as a precise number of years, for example, ten
years. The sentencing judge imposes the sentence within the statutory range of years for a particular offense. 14 The corrections au15
thorities release the inmate upon the completion of this sentence.
Under Illinois law, which provides day-for-day good time, a ten year
sentence is served in five years.
Mandatory sentences are terms of imprisonment, either indeterminate or determinate, which are required by law.
The
mandatory sentence is a legislative creation in which the legislature
"mandates" a compulsory prison sentence for a particular crime.
The sentencing judge has no discretion; the accused must be sent to
prison even if the judge thinks probation is the better sentence.
Although sentencing schemes are usually either indeterminate or
determinate, mandatory prison sentences may be part of either
system.
II.

THE ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE

A.

The Early Years

Illinois' sentencing policy has followed a circuitous route
marked by legislative inconsistency. "Today's exciting new reform
has been yesterday's discarded policy and [may well be] tomorrow's
failure."'16 From the early nineteenth century through the early
twentieth century, Illinois and most other states had determinate
11. In some jurisdictions, "good-time" credits may reduce the minimum
terms served. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, para. 1003-6-3 (1991)) (asserting that prisoners may be released early based
on good conduct).
12. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 597 (2d ed. 1985).
13. Id. Since the inmate was only incarcerated as long as he was "unfit to
be free," the indeterminate sentenced inmate was the "arbiter of his own fate"
and carried "the key of his prison in his own pocket." Id.
14. Cf.Aspen, supra note 1, at 344 n.6 (asserting that determinate "sentencing is for a fixed amount of time within the appropriate statutory sentencing
range for the particular offense").
15. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
1003-6-3 (1991)) (asserting that prisoners may be released early based on good
conduct).
16. Jonathan D. Casper, Determinate Sentencing and Prison Crowding in
Illinois, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 231, 233.
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sentencing. 17 Determinate sentencing was based on the theories of
retribution 8 and deterrence. 19 That is, a convicted person should
be sentenced relative to the crime committed, irrespective of his individual situation.20 Since parole and other forms of early release
were generally not available, once the judge imposed sentence, the
individual served the entire term.21 This system remained intact
22
throughout most of the nineteenth century.
By the end of the century, new penological theories began to
take hold throughout the country. These theories were premised
on the belief that some criminal behavior was caused by social conditions and thus could be "treated." Accordingly, convicted persons
should have received treatment or "rehabilitation," instead of mere
punishment. 23 Since some individuals could not be rehabilitated,
the legislature developed new sentencing techniques to distinguish
between' 24these two groups and determine those who could be
"cured.
These new techniques included probation, parole and
indeterminate sentencing. By 1900, Illinois had instituted these
techniques and others. 25 The use of probation, parole and indeter17. Id.
18. Id. at 233-34; Gray Cavender & Michael C. Musheno, The Adoption and
Implementation of Determinate-BasedSanctioningPolicies:A CriticalPerspective, 17 GA. L. REV. 425, 430-32 (1983); see infra notes 160-184 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the theory of retribution in relation to determinate
sentencing.
19. Casper, supra note 16, at 234; Cavender & Mushino, supra note 18, at
432-34; see infra notes 185-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
theory of deterrence in relation to determinate sentencing.
20. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 601.
21. Id. at 597.
22. See A. Keith Bottomley, Parolein Transition:A ComparativeStudy of
Origins, Developments, and Prospectsfor the 1990's, 12 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 319 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1990) (discussing the origins of parole in the United States, Canada and England and proposing some options for the future of parole in the 1990's); see generally DAVID
DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE (2d ed. 1969).
23. See generally DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE
ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980).
24. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 595-96. A byproduct of the theory of rehabilitation was the shift of power to those persons charged with determining
whether rehabilitation had or could occur. Id. at 597. Parole and probation
officers, as well as prison officials and the parole board, now determine the fates
of many prisoners. Professor Lawrence Friedman argues that this trend continued the "professionalization" of the criminal justice and corrections system. Id.
at 597-98.
25. Id. at 595-600. An 1899 Illinois statute instructed prison officials on determining rehabilitation. The statute "directed the warden to pay attention to
'early social influences' that affected the prisoner's 'constitutional and acquired
defects and tendencies .... .'" Id. at 597. Illinois also used the techniques of
suspended sentence and juvenile probation. Id. at 595-99. Cook County, Illinois
created the first juvenile court in 1899. Id. at 599. The idea became so popular
that within 20 years, almost every state had instituted some type of juvenile
court. Id.
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minate sentencing was the precursor to individualized sentencing in
Illinois.
Through the first half of the twentieth century, Illinois had a
dual sentencing policy. Individuals received either determinate or
indeterminate sentences depending on the crime. 26 At first, courts
imposed all indeterminate sentences equally: all persons convicted
of the same crime received the same maximum and minimum sentence, as determined by statute. 27 By 1943, this policy changed and
courts imposed individualized sentences within the maximum and
minimum permitted by statute. 28 During this time courts also im29
posed determinate sentences where mandated by statute.
By the 1950's, the legislature diversified Illinois' sentencing policy. Both judge and jury could impose either determinate or indeterminate sentences depending on a variety of factors.30 The judge
imposed sentences in criminal bench trials, in felony jury trials
(with the exception of murder, voluntary manslaughter, treason,
rape and kidnapping), and in misdemeanor trials where the statute
mandated penitentiary incarceration.31 The jury imposed sentences
32
in all other convictions as part of its verdict.
The type of statute determined the type of sentence.3 3 Determinate sentences were imposed for murder, voluntary manslaughter, treason, rape and kidnapping, where the person was to receive
penitentiary incarceration.3 4 Indeterminate sentences were imposed for all other felonies and misdemeanors. 35 Both determinate
and indeterminate sentences permitted the imposition of a life sentence.3 6 Diversified sentencing, where the judge or jury could impose either determinate or indeterminate sentences, ended when
the legislature enacted the Criminal Code of 1961.
B.

The 1961 Code

The Criminal Code of 1961 ("1961 Code") was the first of three
recent major revisions in Illinois' sentencing law. The enactment of
the 1961 Code began the process of instituting uniformity to Illinois
sentencing procedures. Under the 1961 Code, the judge sentenced
26.
27.
28.
29.

Aspen, supra note 1, at 345.
Id. at 344 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 498 (1895)).
Id. at 345; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 802 (1943) (repealed 1969).
Aspen, supra note 1, at 344 n.6.

30. Id.
31. Id. at 344.
32. Id. at 344-45.
33. Id. at 345.
34. Aspen, supra note 1, at 345. See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 801

(1959) (repealed 1964).
35. Aspen, supra note 1, at 345.
36. Id. at 345 & n.10.
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all convicted persons.3 7 Where the person received a penitentiary
sentence, that is a sentence one year or greater, the term was indeterminate. 38 If the judge sent the person to jail 365 days or less, the
term was determinate.3 9 The 1961 Code also abolished the sentence
of "life."'40 Although the 1961 Code limited who would impose sentence and which type of sentence an individual would receive, it left
intact the statutory sentencing scheme. Thus, each statute still had
its own penalty section containing a range of possible sentences.
The legislature addressed this problem in the Unified Code of
Corrections.
C.

The Unified Code of 1973

The Unified Code of Corrections ("Unified Code") became effective on January 1, 1973. The Unified Code's three major goals
were "classification, clarification and consolidation. ' 41 The new
code classified all offenses into categories, standardized adult sentencing by categories, created new sentencing alternatives, modified
juvenile adjudication and consolidated the administration and procedures of both the Department of Corrections and the Parole and
Pardon Board. 42 Although there were some substantive changes,
most of the modifications were an attempt to simplify the sentenc43
ing and corrections system.
The Unified Code created eight categories of offenses: five felonies (murder; class 1 through class 4); and three misdemeanors
(class A through class C).44 The code assigned every offense to a
severity category and each category had a sentence range, stated in
37. Id. at 345; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1-7(b) (1961), repealed by ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1008-5-1 (1973), replaced and amended by ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3(a) (1973).

38. Aspen, supra note 1, at 345; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1-7(e) (1961),
repealed by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1008-5-1 (1973), replaced and amended
by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 1005-8-1, 1005-8-2 (1973).
39. Aspen, supra note 1, at 345; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1-7(f) (1961),
repealed by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1008-5-1 (1973), replaced and amended
by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-3 (1973).
40. Aspen, supra note 1, at 345; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1-7(d) (1961),
repealed by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1008-5-1 (1973), replaced and amended
by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3(d)-(e) (1973).
41. Lawrence X. Pusateri & Robert K. Scott, Illinois' New Unified Code of
Corrections,61 ILL. B.J. 62 (1972).
42. Id. at 62-63.
43. Id. at 63.
44. Id. at 62, 69; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-1 (1973) (amended 1978).
The legislature omitted the new categories of "petty offense" and "business offense" from the sentencing scheme. These new categories of offenses continued
to contain their own penalty provision within the statute. Aspen, supra note 1,
at 346 (asserting that both were punishable by fine). This is understandable,
since the possible punishments for these violations did not include imprisonment. Id.
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a minimum and maximum number of years. 45 The Unified Code
retained the 1961 Code's substantive dichotomy of indeterminate
penitentiary sentences and determinate jail sentences. It did, however, seek to standardize penalties among the ten categories of
46
offenses.
In addition, alternatives to incarceration were available for
most offenses. 47 The new Code urged application of the full range
of sentencing alternatives for non-dangerous offenders, such as periodic imprisonment, probation and conditional discharge. The
Code also clarified their nature and availability. 48 The intended result of the expanded use of non-penitentiary alternatives for nondangerous offenders was to achieve fiscal responsibility while pro49
tecting the public and encouraging rehabilitation.
In enacting the Unified Code, the Illinois General Assembly did
not increase the sentence range for substantive offenses. Offenses
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-1 (1973) (amended 1978). The following chart demonstrates the ranges of the new categories:
OFFENSE

MINIMUM TERM

MAXIMUM TERM

FELONIES
MURDER

14 years

unlimited

CLASS 1

4 years

unlimited

CLASS 2*
CLASS 3*
CLASS 4

no minimum
no minimum
no minimum

20 years
10 years
3 years

MISDEMEANORS
CLASS A
no minimum
364 days
CLASS B
no minimum
6 months
CLASS C
no minimum
30 days
BUSINESS OFFENSE**
PETTY OFFENSE***
* minimum sentence may not be greater than one third of maximum
sentence
** (unclassified offense) imprisonment may not be imposed; maximum
fine greater than $500
*** (unclassified offense) imprisonment may not be imposed; maximum
fine less than $500
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-1 (1973) (amended 1978); e.g., ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (1973) (amended 1974).
46. Pusateri & Scott, supra note 41, at 69. In enacting the Unified Code of
Corrections ("U.C."), the General Assembly followed the American Bar Association's StandardsRelating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures. Id. at 62
& n.1. The dual purpose of the A.B.A. Model Sentencing Act was (1) to assist
the legislature by classifying offenses by severity; and (2) to simplify a judge's
sentencing choices. Id. at 69. The intended result of the offense category was to
eliminate disparity in sentences imposed. Id.
47. See Aspen, supra note 1, at 345 n.21 (asserting that sentencing alternatives existed in most offenses, "with the exception of murder, rape, armed robbery and certain narcotics violations").
48. Pusateri & Scott, supra note 41, at 62, 69; see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 1005-5-1 (1973) (amended 1978) (classifying offenses into felonies and misdemeanors); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-3 (1973) (amended 1974) (discussing sentencing alternatives). See also Aspen, supra note 1, at 345 n.21.
49. Pusateri & Scott, supra note 41, at 62, 70.
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in which the trial judge had no discretion at sentencing, such as
murder, rape, armed robbery and certain narcotics violations, remained the same.50 Except for these serious felonies the available
sentence for lesser offenses was generally reduced. 51 Additionally,
the Unified Code also maintained the parole system and expanded
52
the community services available for releasees.
The underlying theory for Illinois sentencing and corrections at
this time was apparent through its techniques. Judges were the
most appropriate group to impose sentences, and received great discretion in doing so. The legislature limited this power by a handful
of mandatory sentences and through prescribing the statutory
range for each class of offense.5 3 Judges imposed indeterminate
sentences based on the rehabilitation model. Accordingly, a convicted person needed to be incarcerated only until he served his
minimum sentence and was rehabilitated. Since the judge was not
in a good position to determine when rehabilitation occurred, a special administrative body, the Parole and Pardon Board, was given
this responsibility5 4 In addition, judges were encouraged to consider alternatives to imprisonment or shorter sentences for persons
who were not dangerous to the community or convicted of lessor
offenses. Therefore, the least restrictive sanction theory was in
55
place: provide society with protection in a cost efficient manner;
50. Aspen, supra note 1, at 345 n.21. See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
1005-5-1 (1972).
51. Pusateri & Scott, supra note 41, at 62.
52. Id. at 67-68. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-14-3 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, para. 1003-14-3 (1973) (amended 1986) (setting forth the services the Department provides such as counseling and educational assistance). Under the Illinois parole system, an inmate's parole eligibility was determined by the
minimum sentence expressed in the indeterminate sentence. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 1003-3-3 (1973) (amended 1974). An inmate earned good time credits based on time served and meritorious behavior. Id. The inmate was eligible
for parole once he had served the minimum sentence, which was determined by
adding time actually served to earned good time credits. Id. Inmates with minimum sentences in excess of 20 years received parole hearings after serving 11
years and three months. Id. Theodore P. Fields, Illinois Parole and Pardon
Board Adult ParoleDecisions, 62 ILL. B.J. 20, 22 (1973) (describing the Illinois
parole system). Once an inmate became eligible for parole, he had parole release hearings at least once every year. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-5
(1973) (amended 1974); see, e.g., Tiller v. Klincar, 138 Ill. 2d 1, 6, 561 N.E.2d 576,
578 (1990). See generally Peters & Norris, supra note 8, at 819-21; see also Frank
S. Merritt, Due Process in Parole Granting:A CurrentAssessment, 10 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 93-95 (1978) (describing the parole system).
53. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text for the mandatory
sentences and the statutory ranges for various offenses.
54. Until the legislature enacted the Unified Code, it was unclear exactly
which body had responsibility and control over parolees, the Department of
Corrections or the Parole and Pardon Board. Pusateri & Scott, supra note 41,
at 67-68. The Code expressly placed the supervisory power of parolees in the
hands of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Id. at 68.
55.

See NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 58-84 (1974).
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incarcerate only when necessary to adequately protect the public;
keep these persons imprisoned only as long as necessary for the
protection of the public, that is, until rehabilitation. Rehabilitation
and fiscal responsibility walked hand in hand.
Under this system, discretion controlled the size of the prison
population. On the "front end," admissions, judges sentenced convicted persons armed with the availability of non-prison alternatives. On the "back end," releases, the Parole and Pardon Board
decided which inmates would be paroled and the Department of
Corrections determined good time credits. This system worked
well in controlling not only the size of the prison population but the
prisoners themselves. 56 There was, however, much criticism that
this judicial and correctional discretion was too broad, and arbitrarily applied. Within four years, this system was discarded and replaced with a relic of Illinois' past.
D.

The Class "X" Sentencing Reform of 1977

In 1977, Illinois dramatically changed its criminal sentencing
and corrections system. 57 The legislature replaced the rehabilitative model with a model based on the punative theories of incapacitation and deterrence. 58
Determinate sentencing supplanted
59
indeterminate sentencing and thus, shelved the parole system.
The new system limited judicial discretion in sentencing and release.60 To fully understand this drastic return to a nineteenth cen56. Casper, supra note 16, at 247-48.
57. Since the Illinois system was based on a "just deserts" theory, determinate sentencing sought to limit judicial discretion in sentencing convicted individuals in the hopes of imposing stricter and longer sentences. James J. Bagley,
Sentencing: The Substantive Law 1-1, 1-9 in Sentencing § 1 (ILL. INST. FOR CLE,
1982) (note: The pagination of this article consists of the section number and
numerical page number, for each page. For example § 1-12 designates page 12,
and does not refer to a series of pages one through twelve.) [hereinafter Bagley,
Sentencing]. Norval Morris used the term "just deserts" to describe the underlying theory for his sentencing and correction model. Some authors assert that
"just deserts" is merely a positive synonym for the traditional theories of incapacitation and retribution. Compare,Leonard Orland, Is Determinate Sentenc-

ing an Illusory Reform?, 62

JUDICATURE

381, 384 (1979) with

MORRIS,

supra

note 55, at 60 (using the term "deserts" as one of three "principles guiding the
decision to imprison" and hopefully rehabilitate the inmate while refusing to
compromise society's interest in punishment).
58. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (1977) (amended 1979)
(stating that "imprisonment for a felony shall be an indeterminate sentence"
with maximum terms depending on the seriousness of the crime) with ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (1979) (amended 1980) (substituting "determinate"
in the place of "indeterminate," adding a Class X felony, and increasing the
minimum and maximum duration of imprisonment for each felony
classification).
59. Bagley, Sentencing, supra note 57, at 1-9.
60. Id.
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tury model, it is helpful to look at the forces and theories behind
this change.
The transition from indeterminate to determinate sentencing
brought about much debate from both sides of the political spectrum.6 1 On the one hand, liberals criticized the indeterminate
system for its unbridled discretion. 62 Since judges could impose any
sentence within a broad category range, many commentators argued that persons received disparate sentences for similar offenses.6 3
Similarly, the Parole and Pardon Board exercised
unlimited and unpublicized discretion in determining release via
parole, once the judge sentenced the person.6 4 This uncontrolled
discretion permitted a parole board to make arbitrary decisions,
with the potential for biased and capricious rulings in determining
65
the actual time served by a convicted person.
Critics also attacked the underlying theory of indeterminate
61. See generally id. (providing an in-depth legislative history of the passage of H.B. 1500). Although nearly all legislators wanted a tougher crime bill,
it took an extra congressional session and some compromise to pass the new
bill. Id. at 1-9.
62. Casper, supra note 16, at 235-36; MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 88-89 (1963). One comprehensive critique of
Illinois' system states that the legislature's primary motivation for instituting
the determinate system was to curb the discretionary sentencing policies of
prosecutors and correctional officers, as well as judges and parole boards. See
Robert P. Schuwerk, Illinois'Experiencewith DeterminateSentencing: A Critical ReappraisalPart 1: Efforts to Structure the Exercise of Discretion in Bargaining for, Imposing, and Serving Criminal Sentences, 33 DEPAUL L. REV.
631, 636 (1984) (providing a review of Illinois' transition from indeterminate to
determinate sentencing) [hereinafter Schuwerk 1]. Professor Schuwerk played
an important role in drafting the determinate sentencing legislation. Professor
Schuwerk provides an insightful view of the entire transition from indeterminate to determinate sentencing in his two part series describing the transition
and its aftermath. See also Robert P. Schuwerk, Illinois' Experience with DeterminateSentencing: A CriticalReappraisalPart2: Efforts to Impose Substantive Limitations on the Exercise of JudicialSentencing Discretion, 34 DEPAUL
L. REV. 241 (1985) (describing the subsequent judicial and legislative decision
which hindered the goals of H.B. 1500) [hereinafter Schuwerk 2].
63. E.g., FRANKEL, supra note 62, at 21-25. Judge Marvin Frankel, a noted
law professor and federal judge, advocated rejecting the "individual distinctions
- discriminations, that is - unless they can be justified by relevant tests .... "
Id. at 11. Judge Frankel also remarked that, "the almost wholly unchecked and
sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning of [indeterminate]
sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes a devotion to
the rule of law." Id. at 5.
64. See Schuwerk 1, supra note 62, at 715-16 (discussing the abolition of parole and the limitations placed on the discretion of Illinois' correctional officials); see also Casper, supra note 16, at 235 (noting the closed parole hearings in
Illinois prisons).
65. See FRANKEL, supra note 62, at 21 (criticizing judges with varying personalities and biases who innocently contributed to the disparate sentencing
system); see also Schuwerk 1, supra note 62, at 636 (highlighting the need to
control the judiciary to insure fairness in sentencing).
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sentencing.66 They argued that the uncertainty of release, premised on rehabilitation, caused inmates anxiety, and possibly increased prison violence. 67 Moreover, several studies indicated that
rehabilitation was unlikely to take place in a forced environment,
such as a penitentiary, and had little effect on recidivism.68 These
criticisms led liberals to reject indeterminate sentencing premised
on the rehabilitation model, and to replace it with determinate sen69
tencing premised on the theory of "just desert."
Conservatives and law enforcement agencies also attacked in66. See, e.g., David F. Fogel, Justice,Not Therapy: A New Mission For Corrections, 62 JUDICATURE 372, 372-73 (1979) (providing a satirical illustration of
Illinois sentencing).
67. Casper, supra note 16, at 236; cf Schuwerk 1, supra note 62, at 637 n.30
(noting that the proposed reform would serve as a release valve for "widely
perceived frustration and anger engendered by the traditional parole release
process").
68. Casper, supra note 16, at 236; Fogel, supra note 66, at 374-75; see MORRIS, supra note 55, at 69-70 (discussing the ability of the courts and corrections
officers to predict the dangerousness of released prisoners).
69. See generally Fogel, supra note 66, at 374-75 (mentioning the variables
which discredited the rehabilitative model). Drafters of the new Illinois law
relied, in large part, on David Fogel's work, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF: THE
JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS (1975). See Bagley, Sentencing, supra note
57, at 1-4 (discussing Mr. Fogel's contribution to H.B. 1500). Mr. Fogel criticized
sentencing and corrections in this country based on the rehabilitative model,
and proposed the "justice model," premised on the theory of "just deserts."
Fogel, supra note 66, at 376 (noting, however, that he was not in complete disagreement with the rehabilitative model).
In 1974, Governor Dan Walker appointed Mr. Fogel to the position of Director of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission. While there, he drafted proposed legislation based on the justice model. Bagley, Sentencing,supra note 57,
at 1-4. The goal of this model was to reduce disparity in sentencing. Cf.id.
(discussing Mr. Fogel's "flat-time" sentencing proposal which "aroused interest
in sentencing reform"). The suggested techniques to implement this goal were
(a) the "fixed sentence" (determinate sentence within a narrow range) id. at 16; (b) the elimination of parole cf. id. at 1-5 (criticizing the "discretionary capriciousness" of the Parole and Pardon Board); and (c) the end of statutory good
time credits. Id. at 1-6. Although the Illinois General Assembly rejected this
legislation, the Adult Corrections Subcommittee, a special House Judiciary subcommittee, later applied principles underlying this legislation to draft House
Bill 1500. Bagley, Sentencing, supra note 57, at 1-4, 1-12.
Various other authors criticized the rehabilitative model and suggested systems based on the theory of "just deserts." See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 20-47 (1971) (focusing on the
rehabilitative aspect of California's correctional system); FRANKEL, supra note
62, at 89-93 (stating that the rehabilitative model is premised on a "baseless assumption" that criminals are treatable); MORRIS, supra note 55, at 89-102 (calling the theory "genetically flawed and malformed"); PIERCE O'CONNELL ET AL.,
TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM 27 (1977) (discussing findings which were the "final blow to the old 'magic moment theory of parole' ");
ANDREW VON HIRSH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 66-76 (1976)

(attacking the discretion of a judge and the potential depreciation of a sentence); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 170-72 (1975) (noting the difficulty of rehabilitation in a prison atmosphere).
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determinate sentencing, although for different reasons. 70 These
groups criticized the rehabilitative aspect of indeterminate sentencing. 71 They claimed that the Parole and Pardon Board were
ineffective as demonstrated by the recidivism rates.7 2 Law enforcement supporters argued alternatively, that a determinate sentencing scheme, with shorter, more certain penitentiary sentences,
would encourage judges to impose prison terms more often. 73 They
claimed more prison sentences would lead to a higher commitment
rate, which would expand the deterrence and incapacitation theories of sentencing and corrections. 74 Moreover, determinate sentencing would curb judicial discretion by preventing judges from
sentencing felons moderately. 75 Therefore, conservatives also supported the imposition of determinate sentencing. In the end, unlikely bedfellows joined together to overhaul the system.
The legislation that would ultimately change Illinois' sentencing and correction policy was a child born of compromise. On
March 31, 1977, the House of Representatives introduced House Bill
1500 ("H.B. 1500") to the Illinois House of the General Assembly.
The bill proposed: (1) a change from indeterminate to determinate
sentencing for all felonies; (2) abolition of parole; (3) guidelines for
judicial discretion in sentencing;7 6 (4) retention of current felony
categories with slightly higher sentences; (5) maintenance of the
current number of mandatory sentences; and, (6) controls on corrections' discretionary decision making.7 7 The theoretical basis for
the proposed bill was to minimize reliance on rehabilitation, which
70. For an insightful analysis of this development see Casper, supra note 16,
at 235-37.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 236; James L. Bagley, Why Illinois Adopted Determinate Sentencing, 62 JUDICATURE 390, 391-92 (1979) [hereinafter Bagley, Determinate).
73. Casper, supra note 16, at 236. Professor Casper states that law enforcement advocates believed that judges were hesitant to send "marginal defendants" to prison terms because the minimum range was so high. Id. Marginal
defendants were those defendants who were "'on the margin' between a long
jail time and a prison term." Id. at 236 n.13.
74. Id. at 236.
75. Aspen, supra note 1, at 347.
76. Much of the criticism of judicial and correctional discretion arose from
the fact that judges and officials did not have to give the reasons supporting
their sentencing decisions. See Bagley, Sentencing, supra note 57, at 1-16 (commenting that the legislature wanted to limit judicial discretion by making
judges more accountable through a recording requirement). H.B. 1500 sought to
remedy this problem by mandating a statement from the sentencing judge, on
the record, as to the factors in mitigation and aggravation he considered in imposing sentence. See id. at 1-6 (noting that one of the first goals of the original
draft was to require such a statement in order to promote more consistent sentencing); see generally Bagley, Determinate,supra note 72 (describing the goals
of the original draft).
77. H.R. 1500, 80th Illinois General Assembly (1977); Bagley, Determinate,
supra note 72, at 391-93.
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was seen as ineffective, and promote the theories of retribution, incapacitation and reformation in the criminal justice system. 78 Supporters believed that this new policy would not contribute
significantly to prison crowding. 79 Thus, if rehabilitation was an
unreachable or improbable goal and if recidivism could not be re80
duced, the system could at least be "just and fair."
Just one week later, the Senate proposed its own sentencing
plan. On April 8, 1977, the new "Class X" legislation was introduced to the Senate of the Illinois General Assembly. With the support of Governor James Thompson, the Senate presented this eight
bill package 8l as a "get-tough-on-crime" plan to alter the present
sentencing and corrections system.8 2 Although there were some
common features between H.B. 1500 and the Class X legislation, the
theoretical thrust of the Senate legislation was punitive: treat convicted felons more harshly.8 3 The Senate package proposed: (1) the
creation of a new felony category, Class X, which had a non-probationable mandatory penitentiary sentence; (2) expansion of the
number of felonies where penitentiary time was mandated; (3)
longer sentences for all felony categories; and, (4) a requirement
that prosecutors file a statement with the court when reducing a
charge punishable by a mandatory sentence, as well as other "tough
on crime" modifications.8 4 Although both H.B. 1500 and the Class
X legislation passed their respective bodies, neither program could
muster enough support for passage by the Illinois General Assembly. After much debate and media coverage, often centering on
which bill was "tougher" on crime, the General Assembly agreed to
a compromise bill.8 5 Governor Thompson signed the new law, Public Act 80-1099, on December 28, 1977.86
78. Cf.Bagley, Determinate,supra note 72, at 396 (labelling rehabilitation
as ineffective and noting the bill's tougher stance on crime).
79. Cf. Bagley, Sentencing, supra note 57, at 1-11 (noting no significant increase in then-projected prison populations).
80. Bagley, Determinate, supra note 72, at 397.

81. S.B. 1272 through S.B. 1279, 80th Illinois General Assembly (1977).
82. Bagley, Determinate,supra note 72, at 392-93; see Thompson, supra note
2, at 204 (commenting on the public demand for a tougher stance on crime in
Illinois).
83. Aspen, supra note 1, at 347-49.
84. Bagley, Determinate, supra note 72, at 392. The eight Senate bills also
proposed: (1) the establishment of a Criminal Sentencing Commission; (2) consideration of certain mandatory factors when setting bail; (3) restrictions on
granting continuances prior to trial; (4) giving the state the right to substitute
judges; (5) a hearing procedure for pre-trial motions; (6) a statewide public defender service; and (7) a statewide grand jury system. Id.
85. Aspen, supra note 1, at 347; Bagley, Determinate,supra note 72, at 393
n.9.

86. Aspen, supra note 1, at 347; Bagley, Determinate,supra note 72, at 393
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E.

The New "Tough on Crime" Law: P.A. 80-1099

The new "tough-on-crime" law was a mixture of the House and
Senate proposals. Public Act 80-1099 contained most of the structural changes advanced in H.B. 1500, including (1) determinate sentencing for all felonies;8 7 (2) abolition of early release parole;8 8 (3)
day-for-day good time credits;8 9 (4) controls on judicial discretion at
sentencing; 90 and, (5) controls on corrections' discretion in determining release. 91 It also included some Class X proposals advanced
by the Senate, such as: (1) the creation of a new category, Class X,
and its mandatory penitentiary sentence; (2) an increase in the
number of felonies with a mandatory penitentiary sentence; (3) the
implementation of longer sentences for most felonies;92 and, (4) the
imposition of various other techniques aimed at increasing penitentiary sentences. The new law joined not only two legislative bills
but also two penal theories. The resulting legislation sent more
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (1979) (amended 1980) (requiring a
determinate sentence).
88. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-2(a) (1977) (amended 1978)
(providing the powers and duties of the Parole and Pardon Board) with ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-2(a)(1979) (amended 1982) (calling for non-discretionary, supervised release at the end of a sentence which may be reduced
only by good time credits). Ridding Corrections of parole release discretion was
a crucial part of determinate sentencing reform. Casper, supra note 16, at 248.
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-6-3(a)(2) (1979) (amended 1982).
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (1979) (amended 1980); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-4 (1979) (amended 1982).
91. Bagley, Determinate,supra note 72, at 394-95.
92. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (1977) (amended 1978)
(calling for a 14 year minimum sentence for murder) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, para. 1005-8-1 (1979) (amended 1980) (calling for a mandatory 20 year sentence for murder).
The following chart demonstrates the category ranges for Illinois' new determinate sentences:
OFFENSE
MINIMUM TERM
MAXIMUM TERM
FELONIES
MURDER
20 years
life
CLASS X*
6 years
30 years
CLASS 1
4 years
15 years
CLASS 2
3 years
7 years
CLASS 3
2 years
5 years
CLASS 4
1 year
3 years
MISDEMEANORS
CLASS A
6 months
364 days
CLASS B
30 days
6 months
CLASS C
no minimum
30 days
BUSINESS OFFENSE**
PETTY OFFENSE**
* mandatory sentence; probation not permitted
** unclassified offenses
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-2 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-2
(1978)); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (1978) (amended 1980); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-4 (1978) (amended 1982).
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people to prison for longer terms with no discretionary method for
releasing them. The new law's effect on the prison population was
inevitable. 93 Illinois has been building, and filling, new prisons ever
since, and now has one of the fastest growing prison populations in
the country.
Since the enactment of the new sentencing law in 1978, Illinois'
sentencing system has undergone judicial and legislative alterations.
The new law's structural controls on judicial and
prosecutorial discretion are now gone, having largely been negated
by judicial decisions. 9 4 The structural controls on the discretionary
decision making by the Department of Corrections, although not
specifically overruled, have proved ineffective. 95 While the structural controls which were intended to help implement the theory of
"just deserts" continue to deteriorate, the legislature increased the
punitive aspect of sentencing. For example, in 1979, there were
eleven Class X felonies. 96 Now there are twenty-six Class X felonies where a penitentiary sentence is mandatory. 97 Furthermore,
93. Casper, supra note 16, at 238-49; Schuwerk 1, supra note 62, at 734-38.
94. People v. Hicks, 101 Ill. 2d 366, 374-75, 462 N.E.2d 473, 477 (1984) (holdiug that a judicial statement of reasons for the imposition of a sentence of consecutive sentences "is permissive rather than mandatory" despite the
mandatory language of the statute which "may be the better practice"); People
v. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d 155, 162-63, 442 N.E.2d 855, 858 (1982) (holding that the statute directing judicial statement of the reasons for imposing a sentence would be
an unconstitutional invasion of the power of the judiciary if the court interpreted the legislation as a mandatory requirement); People v. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d 268,
279, 412 N.E.2d 541, 547 (1980) (limiting the power of appellate courts to review
sentences because "the trial judge is normally in a better position"); see also
Schuwerk 1, supra note 62, at 734 (providing a look into the judicial and legislative changes since 1978).
95. Schuwerk 1, supra note 62, at 734.
96. These class X felonies included: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-4 (1979)
(attempted murder); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-2 (1979) (aggravated kidnapping for ransom); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-1 (1979) (rape); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-3 (1979) (deviate sexual assault); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 12-4.1 (1979) (heinous battery); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 18-2 (1979)
(armed robbery); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20-1.1 (1979) (aggravated arson);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 30-1 (1979) (treason); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
1401 (1979) (manufacture and delivery of controlled substances); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 1405 (1979) (calculated criminal drug conspiracy).
The foregoing new Class X crimes were all Class 1 offenses under prior
law, with the exception of the new offense of heinous battery. Aspen, supra
note 1, at 347 n.39.
97. Today's Class X felonies include: 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-103.3 (1992)
(organized vehicle theft conspiracy); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-1.1 (1992) (solicitation of murder); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-1.2 (1992) (solicitation of murder for
hire); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-4 (1992) (attempted first degree murder); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (1992) (drug-induced homicide); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/10-2 (1992) (aggravated kidnapping for ransom); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1117.1 (1992) (repeat violations of keeping a place of child prostitution); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/11-19.2 (1992) (exploitation of a child); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/12.4.1 (1992) (heinous battery); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4.2 (1992) (aggravated battery with a firearm); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4.3 (1992) (repeat viola-
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there is now a new category, sometimes referred to as the "Super
Class X" offense. 98 This new group raises the minimum mandatory
sentence for certain Class X offenses to as high as 15 to 60 years. 99
In enacting this subsequent legislation, the General Assembly also
changed the one Class X crime, delivery of narcotics, which accounted for the single largest group of new prison inductees. The
General Assembly cut the necessary amount of drugs in half for a
mandatory sentence.1 00 The 1977 determinate sentencing law and
its subsequent alterations over the last sixteen years have dramatically affected Illinois' prison population.
Today, Illinois' sentencing and corrections policy is under attack from all sides. Some of the original supporters of H.B. 1500
criticize the judicial alterations of the determinate sentencing
scheme that have nullified the procedural safeguards on institutional discretion.' 0 ' Absent these safeguards on institutional discretion, today's sentencing and corrections system resembles the
nineteenth century punitive model more than the theory of "just
deserts." Others criticize the system for its dramatic effect on
prison overcrowding. 10 2 Another group, prison employees, criticize
the new system for its effect on their working conditions and
tions of aggravated battery of a child); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-11 (1992)
(home invasion); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13 (1992) (repeat violation of criminal sexual assault); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-14 (1992) (aggravated criminal
sexual assault); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-2 (1992) (armed robbery); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/20-1.1 (1992) (aggravated arson); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1.1

(1992) (unlawful use or possession of a firearm or explosive in a correctional

facility); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/30-1 (1992) (treason); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.

5/31A-1.1 (1992) (bringing or possessing contraband in a penal institution); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31A-1.2 (1992) (employee bringing or possessing contraband
in a penal institution); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33A-3 (1992) (armed violence
with a Category 1 weapon); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-3.2 (1992) (discharge of a
firearm with a metal-piercing bullet); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33D-1 (1992) (contributing to the delinquency of a minor who commits a Class X felony); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 570/401 (1992) (manufacture and delivery of certain controlled
substances); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/405 (1992) (calculated criminal drug conspiracy); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/407 (1992) (manufacturing, delivery and sale
of drugs in schools, public housing, etc.).
98. An example of a Super Class X felony is found in 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
570/401 (a)(1)(D)(1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1401 (a)(1)(1) (1991)).

99. E.g. id.
100. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3 (c)(2)(c) (1985) (amended
1986) (providing that the delivery of 30 grams or more of any substance containing cocaine will receive a mandatory sentence) with 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-53-(c)(2)(c) (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3(c)(2)(c) (1991) (amended

1992) (providing that the delivery of 15 grams or more of a substance containing
cocaine will receive a mandatory sentence).
101. See, e.g., Schuwerk 2, supra note 62, at 264-65 (criticizing subsequent
legislative acts for compounding "the problems inherent in developing a rational sentencing system").
102. E.g., Casper, supra note 16, at 238-39; Michael R. Gottfredson & Don M.
Gottfredson, Guidelines For IncarcerationDecisions:A PartisanReview, 1984
U. ILL. L. REV. 291, 304-05; see Thompson, supra note 2, at 203 (admitting that
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safety.' 0 3 While others comment on the large fiscal burdens determinate sentencing places on the State's already limited financial resources. 10 4 Although all groups agree that some type of change is
necessary, they debate the means and timing of legislative action.
In response to a plan suggested by the General Assembly, Governor Jim Edgar recently set up a blue-ribbon panel of various
groups to make recommendations on possible changes to the current sentencing system. 10 5 These recommendations, along with
others, are expected to reach the Illinois legislature in 1993. Illinois
has gone full circle in its theories and techniques of penology.
There will be a myriad of choices available to the General Assembly, from modification to a total restructuring of the system. None
of these choices will prove effective unless fiscal responsibility and
an awareness of the limits of law enforcement are the cornerstones
of the proposed solution.
III.

THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

A perfect law enforcement system would prevent all crimes.
Jails and prisons would be unnecessary, obsolete and superfluous.
Professor Hans Zeisel aptly noted that law enforcement, as we
know it, "begins to function when it has failed."'10 6 The common
perception of law enforcement is one of apprehension, trial, conviction and sentencing. Ideally, crime would be deterred absolutely
and the current perception of law enforcement would only be of
historical significance. 10 7 Society, however, is a long way from that
ideal.
Where has law enforcement failed? "The truth is that law enforcement, important and essential as it is, cannot by itself signifideterminate sentencing has greatly contributed to Illinois' prison overcrowding
problem).
The'Illinois Department of Corrections has also criticized the dramatic effect determinate sentencing has had on the prison population. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 3, 4.

103. Bob Merrifield, Guard Union Callsfor PrisonSummit, CHI. TRIB., July
23, 1991, § 2, at 5. On July 22, 1991, Steve Culen, executive director of Council
31 of the American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees which
represents 10,000 prison workers, requested Governor Edgar to set up a panel
composed of several interest groups to consider "stopgap measures" to help protect prison workers. Id. The union leader stated that "[w]hile we believe these
steps will help improve security, we are certain that they will not resolve the
underlying problem in the Illinois prison system-severe overcrowding." Id.
104. Thompson, supra note 2, at 203.
105. See Michael Ramsey, Lawmakers Take Middle Road on Crime as Prisons Overflow, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 22, 1991, at 1. (discussing the General
Assembly's avoidance of overcrowding and financial problems in the prison
system).
106.

HANS ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 15 (1982).

107. Cf. MORRIS, supra note 55, at 59 (striving to define a humane form of
punishment "until it is no longer needed for social control").
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cantly reduce crime."' 08 The public perception, which seems to be
shared by many legislators, prosecutors and judges, is that a hard
nosed attitude of stiff penalties can significantly reduce crime.' 0 9
Illinois followed this approach as it shifted away from indeterminate sentencing, toward determinate sentencing, increased penalties for many offenses, and reduced the number of probationable
offenses. Since no one, least of all an elected official, wants to be
labeled "soft on crime," the politically expedient answer has been
to favor legislation which punishes more severely and reduces the
discretionary powers of judges and prison administrators."' Yet,
the bottom line is that "law enforcement is unable to significantly
reduce our high rate of crime.""'
Increasing the penalties for crimes, by mandating prison
sentences and lengthening the time served per offense, is particularly unlikely to have a significant impact on our crime rate.
Professor Zeisel demonstrated this too long ignored fact a decade
ago, when he conducted a study of the impact penalties have on
crime."i 2 In his research sample of 1,000 felonies, 540 were reported
to the police, but only sixty-five persons were arrested."13 Of the
sixty-five arrestees, thirty-six were convicted but only seventeen
were sentenced to a period of incarceration."14 Since Professor
Zeisel's study was conducted in New York, the peculiar problems of
that city could be used to discount his findings. Alert to this problem, he noted that two earlier works, one in 1928 by Felix FrankZEISEL, supra note 106, at 15.
109. See Bagley, Sentencing, supra note 57, at 1-17 (stating that this perception is only a delusion, and that this "get tough" attitude may not reduce crime
rates).
110. See id. (mentioning the political get-tough-on-crime themes which get a
lot of lip service each election year).
111. ZEISEL, supra note 106, at 4.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 17, 18.
114. Id. at 17-19 (explaining the tabulation methods and the potential for
some exaggeration of the system's inefficiency). Since Professor Zeisel con108.

ducted his study in New York City, the peculiar problems of that city could be
used to discount his findings. See id. at 15 (noting only that New York's larger
population leads to higher crime numbers). Alert to this problem, however, he
noted two earlier works which reached similar conclusions, but conducted in
different cities. See id. at 21 (citing FELIX FRANKFURTER & ROSCOE POUND,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 96 (1922) and NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OB.
SERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, No. 9 REPORT ON PENAL INSTITUTIONS, PROBATION AND PAROLE (1931) ("Wickersham Comm'n")). In his 1931 report, George
Wickersham, the Chairman of the National Commission on Law Observance
and Enforcement, concluded:
We conclude that the present prison system is antiquated and inefficient. It
does not reform the criminal. It fails to protect society ...We consider it
both unwise and unnecessary for the States to spend large sums of money
in the construction of maximum security, congregate prisons ....
NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra at

170.
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furter and Roscoe Pound and the other in 1936 by the Wickersham
1 15
Commission, reached similar conclusions.
Current information enhances the validity of Professor Zeisel's
findings." 6 Since 1980, the percentage of known violent offenses
which were cleared by arrest (not convicted) has never exceeded
forty-eight percent." 7 During the same years, property crimes
8
were cleared by arrest at a rate of less than eighteen percent."
After combining violent crimes and property crimes, the percentage
cleared by arrest from 1980-89 was less than twenty-two percent.11 9
Since conviction rates are less than 100%,120 apparently eighty percent (or more) of all known offenses go unpunished.
Moreover, Chief Isaac Fullwood, a twenty year police officer in
Washington, D.C., also came to realize the limits of law enforcement.121 During his twenty year stay, D.C. had an ever increasing
murder rate. 122 According to Fullwood, "more people per capita
are arrested in Washington than anywhere else followed by South
Africa."'1 23 He complained in a recent interview for the New York
Times, that "politicians .. .have sold people a bill of goods: that
tough law enforcement, tougher penalties, mandatory minimum
sentences, the death penalty will make a difference in the war on
crime .... "124 In Fullwood's words, "they won't."'1 2 5 Chief
Fullwood admits there must be a more comprehensive strategy, one
that understands the limits of law enforcement. 126 Illinois must
reach that same conclusion sometime soon.
A system which relies too heavily on punishment cannot succeed when so many crimes do not result in an arrest. Without an
arrestee, there is no one to punish. Without punishment, the incapacitative and deterrent effects of a prison sentence are essen115. ZEISEL, supra note 106, at 21.
116. See generally BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., SOURCEBOOK
(1991) (providing national criminal arrest and conviction data) [hereinafter
SOURCEBOOK].

117. See id.at 447, tbls. 4.25, 4.26 (providing data on national, urban, suburban and rural "cleared by arrest" rates).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See ZEISEL, supra note 106, at 18-23 (graphing occurrence, report, arrest
and conviction rates).
121. Felicity Barringer, Conversations/IsaacFullwood Jr.; Washington's Departing Police Chief Laments The Sleep of Murderers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
1992, § 4, at 7. Isaac Fullwood eventually became the Chief of Police in Washington, D.C. Id.
122. Id.

123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Barringer, supra note 121, at 7.
Id.
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tially irrelevant.

27

One answer to this dilemma might be to increase the number of
arrests. That, however, is easier said than done. Most arrests are a
function of timing rather than detective work. 28 When the police
observe the crime, are near the scene or arrive quickly, the chances
of arrest are good.' 29 But the police cannot be everywhere. Without substantial increases in the number of beat officers, an appreci30
able increase in the arrest rate is unlikely.
The cost of increasing the number of beat officers, necessary to
increase the arrest rate, is prohibitive. Illinois already spends ap3
proximately $2.34 billion on its State and local justice systems.' '
Police protection accounts for more than half of that total. Considering the recent calls for layoffs, budget cuts, and other cost savings
which dominate discussions of State and local budgets, 32 it is unrealistic to expect dramatic increases in the number of policemen
hired by the State or by local governments.
Furthermore, an increase in the number of police officers
would not only drive the budget of police departments markedly
upward, it would also push the other components of the judicial system to, or beyond, their limits. For example, a significant increase
in the number of arrests would overburden many already over34
33
Clogged judicial dockets would reach gridlock.
crowded jails.'
More prisons and more guards would be needed. More guards
would require more health insurance, which costs about $34 million
35
in 1989 alone.'
Money spent on prisons means less money for schools, day care
127. See infra notes 185-205 for a discussion of deterrence and notes 206-223
for a discussion of incapacitation.
128. See ZEISEL, supra note 106, at 33.
129. Id. at 32-33 fig. 9.
130. See id. at 33-34.
131. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 116. at 4 tbl. 1.4.

132. Dennis Conrad, Prison Chief Warns of Consequences of Stiffer
Sentences, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 18, 1993, at 1.

133. See generally Bleich, supra note 7, at 1125 (discussing the factors contributing to the debate over prison overcrowding); Russell W. Gray, Wilson v.
Seiter: Defining the Components of and Proposing a Direction for Eighth
Amendment Prison Condition Law, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1339 (1992) (noting the
problem of prison overcrowding and enumerating the requirements for establishing that prison conditions violate the eighth amendment).
134. See generally Nancy Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional
Restraint and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction,64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321
(1989) (noting the practice of federal courts to shuttle cases or decision making
authority back to the state courts in order to help alleviate their backlog of
cases); Angela Wade, Note, Summary Jury Trials: A "Settlement Technique"
that Places a Shroud of Secrecy on Our Courtrooms?23 IND. L. REV. 949 (1990)

(discussing the summary jury trial as a means of alleviating overcrowded court
dockets).
135. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 116, at 13, tbl. 1.9.
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centers and roads.1 36 If there is not enough money for our schools
and our most vulnerable children, it is unlikely police budgets can
be substantially increased. Finite budgets demand tough choices.
Illinois has avoided this problem for years. Our politicians chatter
about "tough-on-crime" legislation, but the crime rate has not
dropped. We spend more money now on police, jails, and prisons
than we did ten years ago but we are not safer in our homes or our
schools.1 37 Delay in facing this problem will only aggravate an already critical problem. Because we cannot hire enough policemen
to make arrest more likely, it is unreasonable to assume that severe
sentences for those who are arrested will significantly reduce
138
crime.
We are not particularly successful at prosecuting those who are
arrested. Professor Zeisel's study of New York cases showed a con139
viction rate, following a felony arrest, of less than sixty percent.
in a more recent study of 584,450 arrestees in eight states, only fiftynine percent were convicted. 40 The figures for Illinois are consistent with Professor Zeisel's study and with the Justice Department's current findings. It is time for Illinois to develop a statewide
sentencing plan which recognizes the limits of law enforcement and
takes into account the ever rising cost of incarceration.
IV.

WHAT CAUSED THE PRISON POPULATION EXPLOSION?

Conventional wisdom assumes the scale of imprisonment is a
function of the crime rate. 141 As the crime rate increases, the rate
of imprisonment should increase, if the conventional wisdom were
136. On September 28, 1992, many Chicago high school principals met to discuss a proposed 43% cut in their budgets for extracurricular activities. Jacquelyn Heard, All or Nothing on Sport Funding, Principals Say, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 29, 1992, § 1, at 1. On the same day, a court appointed monitor of the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services filed a report criticizing
that agency's plans for the future as "significantly" and "seriously flawed."
Leslie Baldacci, Family Agency Feels Heat, Oversees Calls D.C.F.S. Reform
'Flawed",CHI. SUN TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992, at 1. This agency, charged with helping the most vulnerable children in the state, was badly underfunded. However, the budget for 1992 required cost-savings cuts of 10% of its employees. Id.
This led its then-Director, Sue Suter, to quit. Id.
137. William Recktenwald & Jennifer Lenhart, The Killing Way Weighs
Heavily, Homicide Rate Has a New Meaning in 2 Communities, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 29, 1992, § 2, at 1 (suggesting that the number of murders in Chicago in
1992 was on course for a record high).
138. See infra notes 185-205 for a discussion of the deterrence theory of
punishment.
139. ZEISEL, supra note 106, at 18, fig. 3.
140.

BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., No. 2, NAT'L UPDATE 8

(Oct. 1991) [hereinafter NATIONAL UPDATE].
141. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE
OF IMPRISONMENT 121 (1991) [hereinafter ZIMRING & HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT].
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on the mark. 142 However, the research of Zimring and Hawkins
shows that there are "major discontinuities" between crime rate
and prison population. 143 The Federal Bureau of Investigation
("F.B.I.") "index crime rates decreased during the 1980's [while]
rates of imprisonment [rose]."'1

44

Zimring and Hawkins found that

there was a negative correlation between crime rates and rates of
imprisonment. 145 They offer some plausible explanations for this
finding, although they do not suggest that there is no relationship
between crime rates and imprisonment rates. 1 46 They conclude
that policymakers overestimate the correlation between index
crime rates and the size of our prison populations.
Nor do changes in the political climate have a direct correlation
on the rate of imprisonment. 147 It is often assumed that a law
enforcement mentality, usually associated with conservatives, will
result in higher conviction and imprisonment rates. Liberal governments are viewed as softer on crime thus causing a decrease in
the rate of imprisonment. One problem with this oversimplified
' 48
approach is that public perception of "crime and punishment'
does not change appreciably, even when their elected officials seem
to take tougher law enforcement positions. The public always
thinks criminals are treated too leniently.149 It does not matter
whether imprisonment rates rise or fall, the general public believes
sentences should be stiffer. 1 50 Thus, it is wrong to assume that the
increase in rates of imprisonment is directly tied to the political
party which is in power. If that were true, the decline in these rates
15 1
during law and order administrations would be inexplicable.
Demographics are sometimes cited as the cause of the prison
population explosion. As it turns out, demography is no better at
predicting rates of imprisonment than are crime rates or politics.

52

For example, crime is a young man's vice; it is the male population
between ages twenty to twenty-nine which accounts for most
crimes. 153
That demographic group remained fairly constant
142. Id.
143. Id. at 122.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT, supra note 141, at 124.
147. Id. at 125.
148. See FEODOR DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (George Gibian ed.,
1975) (discussing the effects of an individual's sense of guilt as punishment
when society fails to punish).
149. ZIMRING AND HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT, supra note 141, at 128-30.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 130-31.
152. Id. at 131-32.
153. NATIONAL UPDATE, supra note 140, at 8; Casper, supra note 16, at 231;
Thompson, supra note 2, at 203.
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throughout the 1980's. During that same decade, the rate of imprisonment also should have remained stable if there was a close correlation between demography and the rate of imprisonment. Instead,
the 1980's saw a dramatic increase in the incarceration rate. In the
1960's, the opposite occurred; the youthful offender age group increased by twenty percent but the crime rate fell.1 5 4 Again, the
easy, oversimplified answer is wrong. The rate of imprisonment is
not simply a function of the size of the young male population.
Drug usage and poor economic conditions are two more favorites of the conventional wisdom. Neither, however, can explain the
recent dramatic increase in the prison population. 155 Zimring and
Hawkins did not find a close relationship between the imprisonment rate and unemployment or between the level of drug usage
and the imprisonment rate. Unemployment rates fluctuated
156
throughout the 1980's; the imprisonment rate rose steadily.
Likewise, drug arrests which increased exponentially from 1960-70
did not result in a correspondingly large increase in the rate of im157
prisonment during those years.

The Illinois prison population explosion cannot be tied to an
increasing crime rate, more youthful offenders, a weakening economy or increased drug usage. All of these factors play some role in
the size of our prison population, but none of them account for the
300% increase in our prison population over the past decade and a
half. The more reasonable inference from the existing data is that
Illinois has chosen to send many more, usually poor and undereducated people to prison. The existing data proves that more prisoners does not mean more crime and that longer sentences does not
necessarily reduce crime.
V.

THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT

Criminal sentencing is a complex task which involves the eval58
uation of a variety of often conflicting theories and concerns.
While theories of punishment abound, consistency in application is
difficult to find.' 59 Before determining which penological theory
forms the basis for a particular sentence or sentencing scheme, it is
necessary to briefly examine some of these philosophies. This section discusses the four traditional theories of sentencing, retribu154. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT, supra note 141, at 132.
155. Id. at 132-36.
156. Id. at 133, fig. 5.6.
157. Id. at 135, fig. 5.7.
158. Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principlesfor the Distributionof Criminal
Sanctions, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 19, 20-24 (1987).
159. Franklin Zimring, Principlesof CriminalSentencing, Plainand Fancy,
82 Nw. U. L. REV. 73, 73-75 (1987) [hereinafter Zimring, Principlesof Criminal
Sentencing].
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tion, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, and examines
how those theories often conflict. None of these theories directly
account for, or indirectly consider, the cost of incarceration. These
theories place no limits on the amount of money the State must, or
is likely, to spend. However, if cost is a consideration, as it should
be, Illinois must come to grips with the benefits and drawbacks of
these sentencing philosophies.
A.

Retribution

Until the late eighteenth century, America and England primarily based their sentencing policies on the theory of retribution.
Retribution institutionalized social vengeance. Since people assumed behavior was the product of free will, those who violated the
160
law were responsible for their conduct and deserved punishment.
Society punished wrongdoers so these wrongdoers would not have
an unfair advantage over law abiding citizens. 16 1 Retributive sanctions had a strong moral appeal with a firm Biblical foundation.
Retributive punishment has taken many forms: mutilations,
public executions and floggings. Retribution, which is sometimes
referred to as "just deserts," is still an important component of Illi162
nois sentencing statutes.
1.

Retribution in Reality

Illinois, like most states, has established ranges of sentences
16 3
within which a particular class of offenses may be punished.
These classifications represent a legislative determination of just
punishment for every class of felony. Within these statutory classifications, punishment is presumptively sufficient to satisfy the retribution factor of the sentencing equation. As long as the sentence
meets the statutory guidelines for the offense charged, the legislature has determined that the retribution factor has been satisfied.
Factors such as prior criminal history, exceptional brutality, or
susceptibility to rehabilitation cause sentences to differ for the
same class of offense. Murder is a brutal crime, the punishment
160. See generally Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Meta-

physic of Morals, in 42

GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD

(Thomas K.

Abbott trans., 1980).
161. Id.
162. See People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 493, 431 N.E.2d 344, 349 (1981)
(recognizing "the concept that punishment should fit the offender and not
merely the crime"); People v. Morgan, 59 Ill. 2d 276, 280-81, 319 N.E.2d 764, 767
(1974) (considering a defendant's remorse, respect for the judicial system and
the viciousness of the crime when determining sentence).
163. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-1 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-1
(1991) (amended 1992) (setting forth the appropriate sentencing ranges for various crimes).
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imposed by judges varies anywhere from twenty years to death.164
A judge must find factors to distinguish a twenty year sentence
from the death sentence. Finding those missing factors is a difficult
assignment in many cases, and applying them consistently is even
more difficult.
Nevertheless, appellate judges often reduce murder sentences.
In People v. Smith,165 a trial court sentenced an eighteen year old
defendant with one prior conviction, to 60 to 100 years for murder.
The trial court identified retribution as the principal reason for the
original sentence. On appeal, the court reduced the sentence to 20
to 40 years because the original sentence "severely reduc[ed] the
possibility of defendant's rehabilitation."'1 66 Since the appellate
court valued rehabilitation more than the trial court, the appellate
court reduced the sentence.
An appellate court reduced a 25 to 50 years sentence to a 14 to
25 years sentence in People v. Horton.167 The defendant, a seventeen year old member of the Insane Maniac Cobras street gang, shot
another young man, for gang related reasons. Citing the need to
consider the defendant's potential for rehabilitation, the court cut
the defendant's sentence in half.168 In People v. Gibbs,169 the defendant shot the victim at point blank range. Here too, the appellate court reduced the 50 to 100 year sentence to 15 to 45 years
because the defendant was nineteen years old, employed, and had
no prior criminal record. 170 In each of these cases, the unavoidable
164. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
1005-5-3 (c)(1) (1991)) (setting forth sentencing guidelines for the crime of

murder).
165. 50 Ill.
App. 3d 320, 321, 365 N.E.2d 558, 559 (1st Dist. 1977) (reducing a 60
to 100 year sentence for murder to 20 to 40 years).
166. Id. at 328, 365 N.E.2d at 564 (acknowledging the defendant's young age
and lack of criminal record in reducing a murder sentence).
167. 3 Ill. App. 3d 150, 157, 356 N.E.2d 1044, 1049 (1st Dist. 1976) (finding that
the defendant's sentence was excessive and failed to consider the defendant's
"possibility of rehabilitation").
168. Id. "The sentence imposed [by the trial court] severely diminished the
possibility of defendant's rehabilitation," so the appellate court reduced the sentence. Id.
One court sentenced a 24 year old man, who had a job and no prior record,
to a prison term of 50 to 70 years. People v. Gill, 7 Ill. App. 3d 24, 26, 286 N.E.2d
516, 517 (5th Dist. 1972) (noting the defendant's lack of education and status as a
father in reducing a murder sentence). Although the defendant shot an elderly
man in cold blood over a minor misunderstanding, the appellate court reduced
the sentence 15 to 45 years. Id. at 26, 286 N.E.2d at 517.
169. 49 Ill. App. 3d 644, 645, 364 N.E.2d 491, 492 (1st Dist. 1977) (determining
that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider the seriousness of
the offense and the "objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship" in
a murder sentence). The defendant walked up to the victim's front door,
knocked, and shot the victim at point blank range. Id.
170. Id. at 647, 364 N.E.2d at 494 (holding that age and the lack of a criminal
record of the defendant indicates a propensity for rehabilitation).
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tension in a system which values both retribution and rehabilitation
caused the conflict between the trial and appellate court decisions.
Courts have also reduced criminal sentences based on other
mitigating factors, such as poor social environment, limited education, 171 or an express desire to continue education. 172 In these
cases, the original sentence was also within the legislatively established parameters for retribution. For example, in People v.
Drumheller,173 the defendant beat a fourteen month old child to
death. Yet, the court reduced his sentence from 70 to 125 years to
one which allowed parole after eleven years and which had a maximum release date of approximately thirty-one years. A defendant,
with a prior assault to commit murder conviction, had his murder
sentence reduced from 99 to 100 years to 20 to 35 years in Abernathy
v. People.174 A defendant found guilty of murder and attempted
175
murder had his murder sentence reduced in People v. Viser,
while another defendant with two prior felony convictions had his
murder sentence reduced in People v. Field.176 In People v. Williams,177 the jury found the accused, who had a prior felony conviction, guilty of murder, armed robbery and attempted robbery. The
appellate court reduced his sentence to thirty years. 178 While the
authors have chosen to examine murder sentences, reductions oc171. People v. Kosanovich, 69 Ill. App. 3d 748, 751-52, 387 N.E.2d 1061, 106364 (1st Dist. 1979) (considering a defendant's "unstable family life" as a factor in
reducing an armed robbery sentence).
172. People v. Nelson, 106 Ill. App. 3d 838, 847, 436 N.E.2d 655, 662 (1st. Dist.
1982) (reducing an armed robbery sentence of 20 years to 10 years after considering the defendant's possibility of obtaining a G.E.D. or job training).
173. 15 Ill. App. 3d 418, 424, 304 N.E.2d 455, 460 (2d Dist. 1973) (recognizing
that while "society is outraged by the murder of a child," the court must consider the defendant's background in the possible mitigation of an imposed
sentence).
174. 123 Ill. App. 2d 263, 273, 259 N.E.2d 363, 369 (5th Dist. 1970) (determining that the trial court should provide a "spread" between maximum and minimum sentences when reducing a 99-100 year sentence).
175. 82 Ill. 2d 568, 586-87, 343 N.E.2d 903, 913 (1975) (finding a sentence of 199
to 200 years for murder excessive).
176. 13 Ill. App. 3d 74, 83, 299 N.E.2d 754, 761 (5th Dist. 1973) (reducing a
sentence of 45 to 90 years to a sentence of 30 to 90 years in an effort to meet
"guidelines . .. relati[ng to] minimum and maximum sentences").
177. 3 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7, 279 N.E.2d 100, 104 (1st Dist. 1971) (reducing a felony
conviction from 15 to 30 years because of defendant's young age).
178. Id. at 7, 279 N.E.2d at 105; see also People v. Kane, 140 Ill. App. 3d 928,
932, 489 N.E.2d 500, 503 (1st Dist. 1980) (reducing the sentence of a repeat class
X felon); People v. Adams, 8 Ill. App. 3d. 8, 13, 288 N.E.2d 724, 728 (1st Dist.
1972) (reducing a murder sentence by 35 years); People v. Hill, 6 Ill. App. 3d 746,
752, 286 N.E.2d 764, 769 (1st Dist. 1972) (reducing an armed robbery and murder
sentence by 20 years); People v. Cunningham, 132 Ill. App. 3d 519, 519, 270
N.E.2d 147, 147 (1st Dist. 1971) (abstract op.) (reducing a sentence by six years
of a defendant who murdered his wife); People v. Golden, 1 Ill. App. 3d 947, 947,
274 N.E.2d 892, 892 (1st Dist. 1971) (abstract op.) (reducing a murder sentence
for a defendant with a prior misdemeanor conviction by 15 years).
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cur in all felony classifications. 179
These sentence reductions prove that judges not only consider
retribution as a legitimate sentencing consideration, but also that
judges differ over the weight retribution should be given when reviewing an otherwise lawful sentence. As this brief review of murder sentences proves, it is not at all unusual for appellate courts to
value retribution differently than trial courts. Retribution is but
one factor in the sentencing equation, and it sometimes conflicts
with other legitimate concerns.
2.

Retribution's Role in Sentencing Policy

Retribution - "just deserts" - has a valid role in any sentencing policy. Illinois' high rate of incarceration suggests that courts
do not ignore the retribution component of sentencing. 8 0° Over the
past two decades, Illinois courts imposed mandatory sentences for
crimes which were previously probationable, and have imposed
longer prison sentences. Moreover, the key actors in the criminal
justice system benefit by seeking and imposing a sentence which is
fully retributive. Prosecutors run on records of high convictions
rates and tough sentences. Elected judges are seldom criticized for
being too tough on crime. Consequently, these key decision-makers
have vested interests in long prison sentences. Therefore, they are
not likely to overlook or undervalue retribution.
The role of retribution, however, should not be more important
than several other legitimate concerns. The cost of unabashed retribution is incalculable. A sentence which is more punitive than
the crime justifies undermines public morale and confidence in the
government.' 8 ' Extreme sentences adversely affect the public's
179. See People v. Neither, 230 Ill. App. 3d 546, 555, 595 N.E.2d 124, 129 (1st
Dist. 1992) (reducing a sentence by 56 years for a defendant who was convicted
of four robberies, two aggravated batteries and possession of stolen motor vehicles); People v. Donald, 222 Ill. App. 3d 794, 802, 584 N.E.2d 417, 422 (1st Dist.
1991) (finding a 25 year sentence excessive for a defendant convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse); People v.
Anderson, 142 Ill. App. 3d 240, 243, 488 N.E.2d 557, 559 (1st Dist. 1985) (reducing
a defendant's residential burglary sentence by six years).
180. Ronald J. Ostrow, U.S. Imprisons Black Men at 4 times S. Africa's Rate,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1991, at Al. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 116, at 605 tbl. 6.56
for a comparison of incarceration rates across the nation. See generally MARC
MAUER, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: A COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL RATES
OF INCARCERATION (The Sentencing Project ed., 1991) (maintaining that the
"United States has the world's highest known rate of incarceration, with 426
prisoners per 100,000 population").
181. Professor Zimring reports that during the twentieth century the Peking
government exhibited the heads of drivers who were executed for exceeding
the speed limit. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE:
THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 11 (1973) [hereinafter ZIMRING & HAWKINS, DETERRENCE].
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perception of the role of government, and the cost of imprisonment
continues to rise if retribution is overvalued in our sentencing laws.
The challenge is to impose a sentence which is sufficiently retributive without unnecessarily escalating costs or encouraging offenders to commit more violent offenses. "If the punishment is the
same for simple theft, as for theft and murder, you give thieves a
motive for committing murder.' 18 2 A sentencing policy which punishes minor offenses as severely as major ones, encourages major
offenses. 183 Legislatures must assure that the cost of punishment
does not exceed its benefits. Sentences which are purely retributive
can escalate the cost of punishment. 84 If government is trying to
become more cost efficient, retribution cannot assume the dominant role in Illinois' sentencing laws.
B.

Deterrence

Deterrence developed as an alternative theory of punishment
in the late eighteenth century as a result of changing philosophies
of human conduct and dissatisfaction with the administration of
purely retributive punishments. 8 5 Deterrence as a penological
model was based on the theory of utilitarianism. 8 6 Proponents of
deterrence argued that human behavior was a function of a "hedonistic-calculus," that people chose behavior options which maximized
pleasure or minimized pain.' 8 7 Accordingly, criminal punishment
should be proportionate to the undesirability of the crime. Rational
people are less likely to commit crimes as the cost of the penalty
increases, and it is hoped, punishment of one offender would discourage others from committing the same offense.
Deterrence, like retribution, is sometimes used to justify long
prison sentences.' 8 8 "In European countries sentences greater than
five years are rare."'1 9 However, sentences, in the United States,
are much longer.' 90 But are long prison sentences necessary to protect the public? Do they deter others from committing crimes or do
182. Id. at 204 (quoting

printed in 1 THE

JEREMY BENTHAM,

WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM

Principles of Penal Law, re-

400 (John Bowring ed., (1843)).

183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 2, at 204. Retribution does not ordinarily include any consideration for the cost to taxpayers, on whose behalf retribution is sought. Id.
185. For a more exhaustive study of deterrence see ZIMRING & HAWKINS,
DETERRENCE, supra note 181.
186. See Bentham, supra note 182 at 365.
187. Id.
188. See RONALD L. GOLDFARB & LINDA R. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 17887 (1973).
189. Id. at 178.
190. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U. S. DEP'T OF JUST., CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1988 at 58-61 tbls. 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 (1991) (showing

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 26:317

they merely incapacitate the sentenced prisoner at great financial
cost to society without any significant corresponding reduction in
crime? Researchers posed these questions to experienced correctional officials across the country and many of them agreed "that
only a small minority of all present inmates in American prisons"
were so dangerous that lengthy prison sentences were necessary to
protect society from them.191 Others, however, believe that deter1 92
rence, through stiff prison sentences, is a viable plan.
Deterrence theorists often fail to recognize that while their positions are sometimes diametrically opposed, the propositions on
1 93
which they rest their arguments are not "mutually exclusive.'
The fact that increasingly severe penalties do not eliminate crime,
or even reduce it in some cases, does not mean that punishment
fails as a deterrent. 9 4 Nor does the "common observation" that
people "seek to avoid unpleasant consequences"' 195 mean that every
penalty deters or that all criminal action can be deterred. As Professor Zimring aptly notes, the issue is really one of "marginal de196
terrence," not absolute deterrence.
The first issue that policymakers must address is whether a
more severe penalty would significantly increase the deterrence
rate for a particular offense. 197 Answering that question is not easy,
because deterrence is a multi-factored equation.
First, some
criminals are brain damaged or psychotic. They may engage in
criminal behavior because a mysterious voice instructed them or because they do not truly appreciate the difference between right and
wrong. The threat of future punishment is of little or no value in
these cases. Second, other potential criminals may have little to
lose and much to gain from a criminal venture. A high school dropout with no hope of a job and the chance to make quick money selling drugs may well choose to run a risk that an employed, college
educated person would not run. Yet the range of permissible punishment, the threatened deterrence, is the same for both.
the number of prisoners incarcerated under state or federal jurisdiction by sentence lengths in 1987 and 1988).
191. GOLDFARB & SINGER, supra note 188, at 179.
192. See Norval Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CHI. L. REV.
627, 631 (1966) (stressing that penal reform must strive to achieve greater social
protection).
193. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, DETERRENCE, supra note 181, at 4-7.
194. Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Fffects of Punishment,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 957 (1966).
195. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, DETERRENCE, supra note 181, at 5.
196. Id. at 13-14.
197. See William Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of

Legal Sanctions, 1967 WIs. L. REV. 703, 707-08 (concluding that the legal system

may be operating inefficiently in the manner that it imposes penalties for specific crimes).
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Third, nearly all studies of this issue suggest that the
probability of apprehension plays a significant role in the calculus
of deterrence.1 98 Fear of getting caught deters criminality as long
as there is a threat of some punishment. However, increasing the
severity of the punishment does not always have a corresponding
deterrent effect. 19 9 "[P]otential criminals do seem to calculate the
chances of being apprehended more than the punishment for the
offense if caught."'2°° Of course, that conclusion does not mean that
we should arrest criminals and immediately set them free. What
that conclusion suggests is that, for example, a thirty year sentence
is not necessarily a greater deterrent than a twenty-five year sentence. Ironically, an increase in the probability of apprehension,
followed by a perceived prison sentence, may deter more crime
than an increase in the punishment without a corresponding in20 1
crease in the probability of apprehension.
Fourth, the cost of lengthy prison sentences reduces the funds
available to apprehend criminals. Therefore, the extent that a
prison sentence exceeds its deterrent value, imprisonment is no
longer cost effective. Criminal justice is a zero sum game. Money
spent on incarceration is money lost to apprehension. Money spent
on unnecessarily long prison sentences may contribute to an
increase in criminal activity by reducing the funds available for
apprehension. Examples of this regrettable result abound. Pennsylvania, for example, passed legislation substantially increasing
the penalty for forcible rape in 1966. A review of police records to
determine the effect of the increased penalty revealed that: "Philadelphia found no relief from forcible and attempted rape either
during the excitement leading up to the imposition of strong penalties for these offenses or after the imposition itself. This [held] true
20 2
with respect to both the frequency and intensity of these crimes.1
Philadelphia had the same experience as California. In California,
198. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, DETERRENCE, supra note 181, at 160 (stating
that individuals must believe that the agency is capable of catching and punishing offenders in order to be deterred from committing the crime); see Gary
Becker, Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968) (proposing an economic statistical approach to analyzing the efficiency of
legislation to deter crime); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory Of The
Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (1985) (setting forth an economic
justification for penalties under criminal law).
199. See CALIFORNIA YOUTH AND ADULT CORRECTIONS AGENCY, THE ORGANIZATION OF STATE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES IN THE CONTROL AND TREATMENT

OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 155

(1967).

200. Id.
201. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, DETERRENCE, supra note 181, at 164-65.
202. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, DETERRENCE, supra note 181, at 198 (citing to GEORG RUSCHE & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 193-

205 (1939)); Barry Schwartz, The Effect in Philadelphiaof Pennsylvania's Increased PenaltiesFor Rape and Attempted Rape, 59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE SCI. 509, 514 (1968).
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narcotics' laws were dramatically stiffened in 1961, but the increased penalties did not slow down the rates of arrest for narcotics
violations. Over a seven year period, the number of narcotics ar203
rests rose by almost 2,000 percent.
Illinois has had a similar experience. The "Class X" legislation
of the 1970's is still in force today largely because it appears to be
"tough on crime." Penalties have been increased and in some instances sentencing discretion has been greatly reduced. Probation
is less available now than it was twenty years ago. 20 4 Nevertheless,
over those same twenty years there has not been a corresponding
decrease in crime. In particular, violent crimes have not diminished. Natural life sentences are too routinely imposed, and the
range of permissible punishment for murder is quite high. The
proof is strong and growing - lengthy prison sentences are costly
but their marginal deterrence value is questionable at best. Further, available data "suggest that increases in legislatively provided
penalties for major crimes have little impact as a marginal deterrent in many situations where officials place great faith in such increases." 20 5 A fiscally responsible sentencing policy will demand
more "bang for the buck." There is a point of diminishing returns
where increasing the penalty does not have a corresponding deterrent impact. At that point, fiscal responsibility demands a closer
look at any planned increases in the penalty structure. Clearly,
where the costs outweigh the benefits, increased penalties should
be avoided.
C.

Incapacitation

Incapacitation is a devastatingly simple and, to a point, an unassailable theory. An offender who is in prison cannot commit crimes
against the public. Incapacitation is an individualized form of deterrence. 20 6 The convicted felon is deterred, temporarily, from further
criminal conduct, in the free community, because the felon is
incarcerated.
Besides its inherent conflict with numerous Illinois decisions,
incapacitation is a theoretical failure because society is unable to
accurately predict future dangerousness. 20 7 First, incapacitation
works only if the persons incapacitated are likely to commit new
crimes. There is no need for incapacitation qua incapacitation once
203. See also ZIMRING & HAWKINS, DETERRENCE, supra note 181, at 197-98
(discussing marginal deterrence).
204. See generally Aspen, supra note 1, at 344-51 (discussing how the new
law has discarded the idea that the penitentiary should be a place for
rehabilitation).
205. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, DETERRENCE, supra note 181, at 201.

206. Id.
207. MORRIS, supra note 55, at 68-78.

1993]

Fiscal Responsibility and Criminal Sentencing

the fear of future criminality is very low. At that point society is
paying too much for too little security.
Advocates of incapacitation admit, however, that this approach
has serious limitations. For example, under the incapacitation
model, youthful offenders should be imprisoned more often and for
longer sentences than older ones. Since "crime is a young man's
occupation," the group most in need of incapacitation are youthful
offenders.2 08 Older offenders, on the other hand, are among the
lowest recidivism groups and should be incarcerated for the shortest terms under an incapacitation theory. The probability of a person over age 50 committing any crime is extremely low, only 4.2%
of all persons arrested are over age 50.209 If the age level is raised to
age 60 the probability of arrest drops to only 1.4%.210 This is true
even though these groups make up a large percentage of the total
population. Incapacitation beyond age 50 usually adds little if anything to society's safety but costs society hundreds of thousands of
dollars. 211 Ironically, Illinois, like most other jurisdictions, is wellstocked with appellate decisions reducing sentences just because
the offenders were young.2 12 These cases are irreconcilable with an
incapacitation theory, however, conventional sentencing theories
2 13
often conflict.
Professor Norval Morris cites a compelling example of the failure of the incapacitation theory, which demonstrates the forecasting problems inherent in incapacitation analysis. A 1966 Supreme
Court decision, 214 released hundreds of psychologically disturbed
prisoners because correctional staff, psychiatrists and others who
knew the prisoners, believed the prisoners were dangerous, and
would commit new crimes if released.215 Follow-up studies, however, showed that only two percent returned to institutions for the
208. LARRY J. SIEGEL, CRIMINOLOGY 84-85 (1983); CHARLES E. SILBERMAN,
CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 195 (1978); Robinson, supra note 158, at
19-24.
209. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 116, at 414, tbl. 4.3.
210. Id.
211. SILBERMAN, supra note 208, at 194.
If it is the world you seek there can be no strict justice; and if it is strict
justice you seek there can be no world.
Why do you grasp the rope by both ends seeking both the world and
strict justice? Let one of them go, for if you do not relent a little, the world
cannot endure.
Id. (quoting Abraham's conversation with God).
212. See supra notes 165-79 and accompanying text for an overview of Illinois cases in which the convicted individual received a reduced sentence.
213. Robinson, supra note 158, at 19-24.
214. Id. at 69 (discussing Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966)).
215. Id. These were the inmates deemed most dangerous and most likely to
recidivate. Id.
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criminally insane. 216 Researchers, therefore, concluded that predictions of dangerousness were grossly overinclusive and resulted in
the unnecessary detention of a substantial majority of inmates beyond the time necessary to protect society. If trained professionals
could not accurately predict future dangerousness for the most dangerous of inmates, there is little reason to hope they could do better
for a more representative cross-section. Thus, Professor Morris
concluded that predictions of future dangerousness should play no
role in sentencing because this approach "presupposes a capacity to
predict future criminal behavior quite beyond our present technical
'2 17
ability.
Second, incapacitation theory has "only [a] modest impact on
crime . . . [but] requir[es] enormous increases in prison populations. '' 218 Illinois had the fastest growing prison population in the
nation during 1989.219 In 1977, Illinois had an adult prison population of over 10,000; currently the prison population exceeds
30,000.220 Incarceration expenses surpassed $601 million in 1992,
more than two times the amount spent by the state in 1983.221 New
arrestees and annual expenses of $16,400 per inmate explain this
high figure.2 22 Although more arrestees are going to prison and
staying longer, crime may well be increasing.
In addition to its failure to deter future criminality, incapacitation imposes a substantial burden on taxpayers. 223 The theory of
increasing prison terms collapses amid statistics that show our inability to predict future criminality. Additionally, the modest effects, if any, on crime do not approach justification for the
extravagant fiscal impact. A coherent and fiscally responsible sentencing policy must take these facts into account.
D.

Rehabilitation

Every Illinois sentence must include some consideration of the
defendant's rehabilitative potential. 224 This constitutional mandate
is sometimes difficult to square with the statutory mandate that a
216. Id.
217. MORRIS, supra note 55, at 62.
218. Jacqueline Cohen, Incapacitationas a Strategyfor Crime Control: Possibilitiesand Pitfalls, 5 CRIME & JUST.: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 74
(1983)
219. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 1.
220. Id. at 1-4; COMPTROLLER'S MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
221. TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 1.
222. Id. at 3, 5.
223. David E. Greenberg, The Incapacitative Effect of Imprisonment: Some
Estimates, 9 LAW SOC'Y REV. 541, 541-80 (1975) (setting forth data relating to
the incapacitative effect of imprisonment on crime).
224.

See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11.

1993]

Fiscal Responsibility and Criminal Sentencing

sentence should not depreciate the seriousness of the offense. 225 A
finding of some rehabilitative potential does not necessarily result
in a sentence less than the maximum. 226 Mitigating factors, such as
rehabilitative potential, are subject to countervailing considerations
227
like the seriousness of the offense and other aggravating factors.
The constitutional command, that rehabilitative potential be a
factor in every sentence, is an outgrowth of what Francis Allen calls
the rehabilitative ideal. 228 She defines the rehabilitative ideal as
"the notion that the primary purpose of penal treatment is to effect
changes in the characters, attitudes, and behavior of convicted offenders, so as to strengthen the social defense against unwanted behavior, but also to contribute to the welfare and satisfaction of
offenders. '229 Probation, parole, prison work farms, and prison
counseling programs are manifestations of the rehabilitative
idea.2 30 The divergent means employed by supporters of the rehabilitative ideal range from corporal punishment to prayer and educational programs.2 31
Illinois currently offers a variety of
rehabilitative programs. Religious services are conducted in every

Illinois prison for all major religions and some smaller sects. Prisons also offer educational programs from remedial reading to high

school equivalency and college courses. Job training, work releases,
and other employment related services are generally available to
Illinois inmates, as are individual and group counseling services for
drug and alcohol addicted inmates and for inmates experiencing
225. See supra notes 165-179 and accompanying text for several cases, in
which judges reduced sentences due to mitigating factors.
226. See, e.g., People v. Powell, 154 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1011, 512 N.E.2d 1364,
1368 (1st Dist. 1987). The existence of mitigating circumstances does not require a court to reduce a potential sentence, because mitigating and aggravating
factors "shall be accorded weight," but are not necessarily determinative. See id.
(vacating a maximum sentence and remanding only because the court considered an improper aggravating factor). The lesson of Powell and numerous other
cases is that no mitigating factor, including rehabilitative potential, will necessarily effect the sentence imposed. Id. See also 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3.1,
3.2 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3.1, 3.2 (1991)) (requiring the
courts to weigh the factors, but not to alter potential sentences as a result).
227. Rehabilitative potential, usually found in young or first-time offenders,
provides a reason for imposing a less severe sentence. See supra notes 165-179
and accompanying text for a discussion of several cases, in which judges reduced sentences due to possible rehabilitative potential. Illinois has made no
discernable effort to resolve, other than on a case by case basis, the tension
between rehabilitative potential and the need to impose a sentence which will
not depreciate the seriousness of the offense.

228. See generally

FRANCIS ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE

IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981).
229. Id. at 2.
230. See generally NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON
AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM (1990); DAVID T. STANLEY, PRISONERS AMONG Us: THE PROBLEM OF PAROLE (1976).

231. ALLEN, supra note 228, at 3.
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family and psychiatric problems. In these respects, the rehabilitative ideal is not dead in Illinois.
Francis Allen traces the general support for the rehabilitation
ideal and the academic dominance of this theory to the 1970's.232 By
the mid 1970's, though, that support began to wane, and the call for
sentences as punishment grew steadily louder. 233 Illinois' shift
from indeterminate sentencing to determinate sentencing reflected
the changing attitude of society as a whole.
Allen calls the decline of the rehabilitative ideal "substantial"
and "precipitous. '234 She traces the decline to a number of factors,
235
but chiefly to a loss of confidence in our socializing institutions.
Pervasive pessimism about government agencies hallmarked the
Reagan and Bush presidency. The call to get government off our
backs was appealing to a significant majority of the voters over the
past twenty years. These trends are symptomatic of a loss of confidence in the rehabilitative ideal.
Allen also notes that support for a rehabilitative ideal
presumes that there is a consensus on the objective of rehabilitation.236 Our pluralistic melting pot, however, does not present the
optimum conditions for consensus. What is a cure and how it is to
be achieved, are questions which can not be easily answered in our
society. 237 "Yet rational penal policy demands that the scrutiny of
policy options proceed and that efforts be made to identify the
problems characteristic of such alternatives and to inquire which of
the old dilemmas are likely to persist. '23 8 Illinois policymakers
have made meager efforts to identify the persistent problems and to
seek alternative solutions, particularly in the area of criminal
sentencing.
It is clear to anyone who visits an Illinois prison or reads the
Department of Corrections' publications that the principal concern
of wardens is not rehabilitation. Their principal concern is confinement without additional violence. Prison overcrowding has exacerbated the violence within Illinois prisons and renewed the
Department's concern for confinement first and rehabilitation
later.
Some people call prisons classrooms of crime, because recidivism rates are unacceptably high. From these easily made observa232. Id. at 5-7.
233. Id. at 8-9.
234. Id. at 10.
235. Id. at 19.
236. ALLEN, supra note 228, at 25-33.
237. See ANTHONY BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1972) for a literary examination of this question.
238. ALLEN, supra note 228, at 61.
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tions, too many policymakers assume that all efforts at
rehabilitation are and will be unsuccessful. More thoughtful observers recognize that a "coercive cure" is unlikely and that rehabilitative programs should be facilitative not mandatory. 2 39 The
Illinois Department of Corrections should offer rehabilitative programs so the truly motivated inmate can use them to change himself. Participation in those programs, however, should be voluntary
and non-participation should not adversely affect release dates.
Rehabilitation occurs only when there is a personal commitment to long term change. If the inmate participates in programs
because it "looks good" to the parole board, the personal commitment necessary for "rehabilitation" is missing. 240 A coherent sentencing policy must take into account: a) the possibility of a
personal decision to change; b) the need to facilitate that commitment; and c) the unlikelihood of a coerced cure. Rehabilitative programs should remain a part of the Illinois prison system, and the
State should consider the potential for personal change when sentencing and releasing inmates.
VI.

ILLINOIS' PRISON POPULATION AND COSTS: AN OVERVIEW

From 1920 through 1977, Illinois' prison population remained
relatively static, ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 inmates, 241 even
though the State's general population increased from 6.5 million to
approximately 11.3 million during the same period. 242 Illinois'
prison population, however, increased drastically after 1977. Between 1983 and 1992, Illinois' total adult and juvenile prison population rose from 26,001 to 55,489.243 Contributing to the growth rate
were consecutive 20.9 percent and 19.1 percent adult prison population explosions in fiscal years 1989 and 1990, the nation's highest
rate for those periods. 244 This tremendous increase in the prison
population over the past fourteen years was accompanied by an in245
crease in the State's general population of less than one percent.
The Department of Corrections predicts a 60.7% growth rate in the
adult population (18,463 inmates) by the year 2000.246 This policy of
imprisoning a vastly larger number of persons can only be explained by Illinois' sentencing "reform."
239. Id. at 83.
240. Id. at 82-84.
241.

TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 1.

242. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1992 74-75 (Mark S. Hoffman ed., 1991) [hereinafter WORLD ALMANAC].
243. COMPTROLLER'S MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
244. Id.; TRANSITION PAPER, supra note 3, at 1.
245. WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 242, at 74-75.
246. COMPTROLLER'S MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
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As noted in an earlier section,247 Illinois' sentencing policy underwent three major transformations during the second half of this
century: the 1961 Code, the Unified Code of 1973, and the Class "X"
Sentencing Reform of 1977. Of these three changes, only the final
one, the sentencing reform of 1977, had any meaningful impact on
the prison population. The 1977 law, which imposed determinate
sentencing, abolished parole, and increased felony and mandatory
sentences, marked the beginning of Illinois' prison population
explosion.
State spending for corrections over the past ten years exemplifies this growing phenomenon. The Department of Corrections was
the fifth largest spender of General Revenue Funds in fiscal 1992.248
The $565.5 million spent by corrections in fiscal 1992 was $321.8 million more than used by the same department in fiscal 1983.249
Spending in five of the past ten years showed double digit percentage increases.250 The Capital Development Fund ("C.D.F.") also
contributed substantial funds to finance the massive prison expansion program. 251 Over the past ten years, $541.6 million of C.D.F.
monies were used to build and expand new prisons. 252 After all of
this, Illinois' correctional facilities still cannot keep pace with its
ever-increasing prison population.
From fiscal 1983 to fiscal 1992, the number of individuals in corrections custody or under corrections supervision increased more
than twofold, from 26,001 to 55,489.253 During this same time period, the number of individuals incarcerated in adult institutions increased from 13,310 to 28,720.254 Of the 55,489 individuals under the
control of the Illinois Department of Corrections at the end of fiscal
1992, 52,775 (95.1%) were in adult programs. Of this figure, 28,720
(51.7%) were in adult correctional centers, 1,013 (1.8%) in community correctional centers, 699 (1.3%) under electronic monitoring
and 22,343 (40.3%) under parole supervision. 255 Although Illinois
experienced a massive correctional facilities expansion during these
247. See supra notes 16-105 and accompanying text for an overview of Illinois' experience with sentencing policies.
248. COMPTROLLER'S MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. The state
agencies which used more general funds were the Department of Public Aid,
the State Board of Education, state universities and the Department of Mental
Health and Developmental Disabilities. Id.
249. Id. at 1.
250. Id.
251. Id. The Capital Development Fund receives contributions from bond
sales for use in capital projects. Id. at 2.
252. COMPTROLLER'S MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
253. Id. at 3. This figure does not include those individuals held in the state's
93 county jails, which had an average daily population of 11,944 in fiscal 1991.

Id.
254. Id. at 3.
255. Id. The remaining 2,714 individuals are in juvenile programs. Id.
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ten years, prison crowding and inmate unit costs have increased
while staff/prisoner ratios and the number of single cell inmates
have decreased.
In fiscal 1983, the adult prison population was 13,735 in facilities
rated for a capacity of 13,518 (102% of rated capacity). 256 During
the next ten years, the rated capacity for Illinois' correctional facilities increased to 24,215, including community correctional centers
and electronic monitoring programs. 25 7 This includes six newly
constructed facilities which have been built but are not open, due to
the fiscal crisis. 25 8 At the end of fiscal 1992, the number of adult
inmates in custody grew to 30,432 raising the number of inmates to
rated capacity to 126%.259 The Department of Corrections' inmate
annual costs for adult prisoners also rose from $13,252 to $15,716.260
Although the number of staff personnel increased 87.4%, from 3,575
to 6,700, during this ten year period, the staff to inmate ratio decreased to .340, including a security staff to inmate decrease to
.240.261 Accompanying this decrease was the reduction of single celled inmates from 38% in fiscal 1984 to 27% at the end of fiscal
1992.262 It is not surprising that both the Illinois Department of
Corrections and the State Comptroller's Office have laid the blame
for the inmate population explosion and its accompanying costs on
263
the 1977 sentencing reforms.
Two of the fastest growing groups of adult prisoners in the past
decade have been drug offenders and residential burglars. These
offenders often receive mandatory prison terms, regardless of the
individual's prior criminal history, age or degree of violence involved in the crime. 264 There were 534 drug offenders in Illinois
prisons at the end of 1983.265 By the end of 1991, this number increased nearly one thousand percent to 5,271.266 Prisoners convicted of residential burglary also account for the drastic increase in
the prison population since 1982, when the legislature mandated a
256. COMPTROLLER'S MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.

263.

STATISTICAL PRESENTATION 1991, supra note 6, at i; COMPTROLLER'S

COMPTROLLER'S MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.

Id.

MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 3-4.

264. See 730 ILL. COMP.

STAT. 5/5-5-3

(1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.

1005-5-3 (1991) (amended 1992) (imposing the applicable minimum term of imprisonment for the conviction of residential burglary or the violation of the
Controlled Substance Act).
265. Id.
266. STATISTICAL PRESENTATION 1991, supra note 6, at i; COMPTROLLER'S
note 4, at 4.

MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT, supra

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 26:317

prison sentence for the crime.267 The number of persons imprisoned for residential burglary has increased from 1,199 to 1,351 in
the past nine years.268 These are two examples of crimes, which are
often non-violent in nature, but have a penalty of a mandatory
prison term with no possibility of early parole, contribute to Illinois'
prison population explosion and its accompanying costs. The Illiof
nois Department of Corrections recently projected the growth 269
the prison population to be 60.7% before the end of the century.
This projection is based on the current determinate sentencing
scheme with its nondiscretionary mandatory sentences and abolition of early parole.2 7 0 The only way the legislature can decrease
these future costs while providing for the public safety is to modify
the "front end" variable of prison population, admissions; the "back
end" variable, releases; the conditions of confinement, and alternatives to prison incarceration. To this end and with fiscal responsibility in mind, the authors suggest a modest proposal.
VII. PROPOSAL

Illinois will not achieve a fiscally responsible sentencing policy
without first recognizing the divergent, and often competing, interests which control the number of new prison sentences and releases
each year. At the "front end," admissions are not controlled by a
statewide policy. County prosecutors and judges determine what
charges are filed, the guilty pleas which are entered, whether
charges will be dropped or reduced and ultimately, what sentence is
imposed. Admissions are a function of the discretionary powers of
officials with a vested interest in sentencing an individual to prison
rather than probation and to longer rather than shorter
sentences. 271 No elected prosecutor or judge wants to be labeled
soft on crime and these elected officials control the rate of prison
admissions. It is unrealistic to assume these elected officials will
propose, let alone implement, a policy which will significantly reduce the number of prison admissions or shorten the length of
prison sentences.
The State, not individual counties, bears the expense of the
ever increasing prison population. Illinois Department of Corrections spokespersons annually complain that there are too many
267. COMPTROLLER'S MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
268. STATISTICAL PRESENTATION 1991, supra note 6, at 48.
269. COMPTROLLER'S MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 6.
270. Id.
271. John Kass & William Recktenwald, More Jails Called Cure to Killings,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 5, 1991, § 1, at 1 (reporting that the then-United States Attorney, Fred Foreman, and Cook County State's Attorney, Jack O'Malley, called
for more prisons to be built as a cure for the state's murder epidemic and further stated that taxpayers would support the measure).
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prisoners, too few guards and not enough money. 272 These com-

plaints have fallen on deaf ears. To establish a fiscally sound sentencing policy, the "front end" powers, prosecutors and judges,
must be given some leeway to offer probation, electronic monitoring and other alternative sentences in non-violent felony cases.
This is particularly appropriate for first time offenders. Yet, year
after year, Illinois' sentencing laws have reduced the discretionary
powers of prosecutors and judges by mandating prison sentences in
non-violent cases.
Since these "front end" elected officials have a vested interest
in prison sentences, it is not advisable or necessary to check their
discretionary powers by prohibiting electronic monitoring for nonviolent first time offenders. By returning discretionary authority to
prosecutors and judges, Illinois would reduce the number of prison
admissions. However, given the officials' interests in appearing
"tough on crime," prosecutors and judges cannot be counted on,
alone, to significantly reduce the costs of an excessive and ever
growing prison population. Therefore, any sentencing reform
which is fiscally responsible must include a release, or "back end"
component. Therefore, the authors submit the following three part
proposal.
Part one of this proposal suggests changing the statute mandating prison sentences should be changed to permit alternative
sentences for non-violent crimes. The Unified Code of Corrections 273 sets out the crimes for which penitentiary sentences are
mandatory. 274 The list of crimes includes Class X felonies,27 5 certain forcible felonies, 276 residential burglary and various narcotics
offenses. 277 Class X offenses include certain violent crimes and several narcotics offenses. 278 The authors suggest that the General Assembly change the non-violent crimes for which a prison term is
currently mandatory, narcotics offenses and residential burglary, to
permit the sentencing judge to impose alternative sentences. This
proposal does not change the classification of these crimes, that is,
the range of years which a judge could impose as a sanction.
272. See Conrad, supra note 132, at 1.
273. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1-1 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1001-1-1
(1991)).
274.

See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.

1005-5-3(c)(2) (1991) (amended 1992) (listing those offenses that have a mini-

mum mandatory term of imprisonment).
275. Id.
276. Id. The judge must impose a penitentiary sentence, if the offender is
convicted of a forcible felony that is related to "the activities of an organized
gang."
277. Id.
278.

See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4.1 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,

para. 12-4.1 (1991)) (designating heinous battery as a Class X felony).
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Rather, the suggestion would change the conditions of confinement
to permit probation or other alternative sentences where appropriate. 279 Although this proposal may seem soft on crime, the authors
submit that this change would be both fiscally responsible and more
effective as a weapon in the war on drugs.
Currently, judges have no discretion in many drug sentencing
hearings. 28 0 Judges must sentence offenders to prison regardless of
the defendant's individual attributes, such as his prior criminal record, age or drug dependency. If judges were permitted to impose
alternative sanctions to fit the individual defendant (especially the
first time offender), such as drug treatment, electronic monitoring,
281
intensive probation, boot camp or other intermediate sentences,
the financial savings to the State could be substantial. At the same
time, the incapacitative effect of electronic monitoring would provide adequate protection to the public.
Alternative sentencing for drug offenders is effective and cost
efficient. In Miami, a new program with alternative sentencing for
first time drug offenders showed a high success rate. Of the over
1740 individuals who participated in the program, the recidivism
rate was only 3% compared to a 33% rearrest rate for similar offenders not in the program.28 2 If Illinois implemented a similar
program, the potential savings for individuals on electronic monitoring, instead of in prison, would be roughly $10,000 per year per
inmate. 28 3 Moreover, a recent study shows that even where the
State pays for the probation and drug treatment of offenders, it
284
saves more money and is more effective than prison sentencing.
279. See generally Jeffrey N. Hurwitz, Note, House Arrest: A CriticalAnalysis of an Intermediate-Level Penal Sanction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 772 (1987)
(discussing other forms of punishment and rehabilitation).
280. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 1005-5-3 (1991) (amended 1992) (listing the drug offenses where the court
must sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment).
281. See Norval Morris, Punishment Without Prison, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 20,
1992, § 1, at 25. Professor Morris discusses the need for intermediate punishment which he defines as punishment which lies between prison and probation.
Intermediate punishment includes community service orders, home confinement, house arrest, halfway houses, boot camps, drug and alcohol treatment,
intensive probation and a variety of community-based punishments.
282. Christopher Boyd, Miami DrugProgramBoasts High Success Rate, CHI.
TRIB., May 4, 1992, § 1, at 16 (reporting that the Miami drug program for first
time offenders shows a 97% success rate).
283. Compare Jerry Thomas & Andrew Martin, Electronic Monitoring No
Cure-All For Crime, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1992, § 1, at 1 (reporting that I.D.O.C.
spokesperson Nic Howell states that 5,000 persons have participated in the
electronic monitoring program since its inception in 1989 and that the cost of
monitoring an inmate electronically is $5400 per year) with COMPTROLLER'S
MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5 (asserting that the I.D.O.C. reports
that the annual cost per adult prisoner in 1989 was $16,462).
284. David Olson & Roger Przybylski, PotentialSavings Could Offset Costs
of Drug Treatment for Offenders, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 4, 1991, at 2 (re-
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Since many experts already agree that drug treatment, education
and drug prevention are better tools in the war on drugs than law
enforcement, 285 this proposal would provide the judiciary with
more effective and less expensive alternatives to incarceration.
Some who analogize drugs with violence might criticize this
proposal as coddling criminals and not adequately protecting the
public. The authors respond to this argument in two ways. First,
the proposal permits alternatives to incarceration only for non-violent offenders. The proposal does not affect cases where a drug
offender or residential burglar uses a weapon or otherwise threatens the use of violence. Further, there are existing statutes which
prosecutors may use to upgrade these offenses to mandatory prison
terms where violence or the threat of violence is present. 28 6 Second, the proposal does not change the classification for these selected offenses. Thus, the sentencing judge may still sentence an
individual to the same term which was previously permitted by law.
This has a dual advantage. It places discretion back into the hands
of the judiciary in carving out the appropriate sentence for an individual while muting the political concerns of legislators who do not
wish to be labeled "soft on crime."
Part two of this proposal suggests expanding the judiciary's
ability to impose intermediate and alternative sanctions. Judges
currently may sentence an individual to imprisonment, periodic imprisonment, probation, impact incarceration, and (under very limited circumstances) electronic monitoring. 287
However, these
printedfrom Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, The Compiler)
(comparing the cost of drug treatment and probation with prosecution and
prison terms, and concluding that money can be saved by utilizing a drug treatment program).
285. See Rob Karwath, Study Links High DropoutRate to State Prison Overcrowding, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 15, 1991, § 2, at 3 (asserting that a direct correlation
exists between a state's high school dropout rate and its incarceration rate; for
example, Minnesota has the highest graduation rate, and the second lowest incarceration rate, while the District of Columbia has the lowest graduation rate
and the highest incarceration rate); see also Joseph B. Treaster, Some Think the
'War on Drugs'isBeing Waged on Wrong Front, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1992, at
Al (citing several drug experts who opine that treatment, education and drug
prevention are much more successful than law enforcement in the war on
drugs).
286. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33A-1, 5/33A-3 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, paras. 33A-1, 33A-3 (1991)) (asserting that a person who commits a felony
while armed with a dangerous weapon, such as a firearm or a dangerous knife,
commits a Class X felony).
287. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-7-1 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
1005-7-1 (1991) (amended 1992) (imposing periodic imprisonment and electronic
monitoring in conjunction with periodic imprisonment); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/5-8-1 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (1991)) (requiring incarceration); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-1.1 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-81.1 (1991)) (imposing impact incarceration); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-6-1 (1992)
(ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-1 (1991)) (describing the court's power to
impose the sentence of probation).
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sentences are permissible for limited classifications of offenses.
The authors propose that the legislature permit the judiciary to impose these sanctions, especially home confinement with electronic
monitoring, in a more expansive manner. This would allow judges
to sentence an individual to electronic monitoring and home confinement in lieu of or in combination with a prison sentence. For
example, where a sentencing judge desires to incapacitate an individual for two years, he could sentence the individual to one year in
prison and one year electronic monitoring instead of two years in
prison. The savings would be substantial both in reducing incarceration costs (at a rate of approximately $10,000 per individual per
year) and in preserving precious prison space for more deviant offenders. This suggestion will also alleviate the need for building
new prisons, thus lowering construction costs.
Parts one and two of this proposal provide methods to deal with
the "front end" variable in prison overcrowding, admissions. Part
three of the proposal suggests a means to control the State's prison
population if admissions continue to increase. The authors propose
that the General Assembly authorize the governor to declare a state
of emergency when the prison population reaches 98% of its rated
capacity. If the governor declared a state of emergency, the director
of the Department of Corrections would be authorized, in conjunction with the Prisoner Review Board, to release certain inmates to
electronic monitoring. Several states already have similar statutes
which have proven successful. 288 Decreasing the overcrowding
problem can not be overemphasized. Illinois has built fourteen new
prisons in the last fifteen years, but even the Department of Corrections concedes that Illinois cannot build its way out of the overcrowding problem. 28 9 If the sentencing changes proposed in parts
one and two were not effective in reducing the prison population,
part three of the proposal would ensure the availability of a safety
valve for the Department of Corrections to control overcrowding.
The authors also renew their proposal to return to the Prisoner Review Board, the power to parole inmates who have served the mini288. See, e.g., Michigan's Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act,
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 800. 71-79 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 944.598(3) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993) (authorizing the release of inmates
serving sentences of three years or less under certain emergency situations); see
also Bleich, supra note 7, at 1168-70 (discussing various states' plans to deal with
prison overcrowding); see generally Mark Dykstra, Apartfrom the Crowd: Florida'sNew Prison Release Program,14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779 (1986) (describing
various remedies to prison overcrowding).
289. See Conrad, supra note 132, at 1; see also William Raspberry, Makes the
Casefor the Futility of Imprisonment, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 1991, § 1, at 11 (comparing the incarceration rate of the United States, which doubled during the
1980's with no decrease in the crime rate, with Germany and England, which
both decreased their prison rates substantially in the 1980's with no increase in
crime rate).
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mum statutory prison sentence for their offense classification. This
proposal, made in the first of these articles, would not entitle anyone to parole, but it would allow the Prisoner Review Board to release inmates because of a demonstrated potential for useful
citizenship or to alleviate overcrowding.
CONCLUSION

Illinois cannot end the escalating cost of imprisonment but, to a
significant degree, it can slow the overall cost to the taxpayers. By
returning discretionary powers to the prosecutors and judges who
control the rate of admissions, Illinois can slow down the admissions rates. There are non-violent offenses which currently carry
mandatory prison terms upon conviction. Allowing electronic monitoring, home confinement or other alternatives to prison sentences
for non-violent first offenders, will reduce the number of new
prison sentences without jeopardizing public safety. Taking this
modest step in conjunction with a release component will cap Illinois' prison population. A shift in sentencing which takes one year
off prison sentences and switches that year to electronic monitoring
can save hundreds of millions of tax dollars in less than a decade.
Changing prison sentences to electronic monitoring saves approximately $10,000 per year per inmate. 290 There are more than 28,000
inmates in Illinois who are serving terms of imprisonment (excluding prisoners sentenced to death or to life without parole). If one
year of each of those prison sentences was changed to electronic
monitoring, Illinois would save in excess of $280 million over the
next 5 to 10 years. Whether this switch is at the "front end," the
"back end" or a combination of the two is less important than the
saving it will ensure.
Furthermore, if Illinois follows this proposal it may be able to
lease the four prisons that have been built but are unoccupied due
to the lack of funds. 291 By leasing these facilities to other states or
to the federal government, Illinois can put people to work, as
guards and other correctional staff, and can generate a profit from
these leased facilities.
The Illinois Department of Corrections estimates that under
the present sentencing policies there will be an increase in prison
population of over sixty percent before the end of the century. The
time for change is now and the only viable alternative is to place
fiscal responsibility as the cornerstone of a new sentencing policy.

290.

COMPTROLLER'S MONTHLY FISCAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 27.
291. See Ramsey, supra note 105, at 1 (asserting that the I.D.O.C. budget for
1991-1992 will delay the opening of Rend Lake Prison and work camps in Clayton, Duquoin, Paris and Green counties).

